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ABSTRACT 
 
From 1943 to 1969 the United States had a thriving biological weapons program 
to develop new ways of targeting its adversaries. With the 1972 creation of the Biological 
Weapons Convention, the United States relinquished its program and sought to prevent 
other countries from possessing these lethal weapons. While previously the United States 
mainly worked with other states and the international community to minimize the threat 
from biological weapons, the 2001 anthrax attacks changed this landscape by adding a 
domestic dimension. This thesis explores three major aspects of the biological threat to 
the United States: domestic lone wolf actors, possible future state threats, and the failing 
aspects of the Biological Weapons Convention. An analysis of each aspect of the 
biological threat is performed to identify the role they each may play in future U.S. 
security decisions. Among the multitude of threats that can arise from biological 
terrorism and weapons, these particular threats are the most likely to shape future U.S. 
decision making, both domestically and at the international level. Through an analysis of 
a specific aspect of the biological threat towards the United States, each chapter 
illustrates the biological threat to the United States is real, menacing, and must be 
addressed for the future of U.S. security. Due to continuous changes in technology, 
domestic terrorism threats, and state-to-state relationships, this thesis highlights the need 
to acknowledge the importance of the biological threat in order to mitigate the rise of a 
threat that has tremendous implications for U.S. security and the survival of the U.S. 
population as a whole.  
Thesis Advisors: Drs. Rameez Abbas and Alexander Rosenthal 
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INTRODUCTION 
Biological agents aren’t as widely discussed as some of their other Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) counterparts, but they have the capability 
to silently kill millions before those individuals even know they have come in contact 
with a lethal substance. Efforts to curtail the threat of biological weapons (BW) remained 
focused on the international level from the creation of the U.S. biowarfare program in 
1943 until the 2001 lone wolf anthrax attacks, which occurred one week after the 
September 11th terror attacks. This paper explores three major aspects of this biological 
threat to the United States: domestic lone wolf actors, possible future state threats, and 
the failing aspects of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The central theme of 
this thesis is that a multifaceted approach to dealing with the biological threat to the 
United States is of the utmost importance given the variety of biological threats present 
today.  
 As the biological threat morphs over the years and scientific advances continue, 
an understanding of the primary biological threats to the United States is paramount to 
U.S. security-but this understanding is a moving target. In order for U.S. policy makers to 
prevent a biological attack on U.S. soil and U.S. interests, they must acknowledge these 
threats and work to shift U.S. policy in a proactive rather than a reactive direction. 
Research on the biological threat to the United States is present in academic and security-
related publications, but few take the extra steps to analyze the issue at several different 
levels. An analysis of different levels of the biological threat is performed within this 
paper to identify the role they each may play in future U.S. security decisions. 
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The first chapter asks how the leaderless resistance movement has shaped U.S. 
bioterrorism policy. Leaderless resistance is referred to in academic literature as an 
individual or small group, detached from any central network, engaging in “anti-state” 
violence. Warnings from U.S. law enforcement and security professionals have 
highlighted the shift in extremist attacks from a centrally-directed to a more detached 
“leaderless resistance” approach. Understanding of the correlation between these 
disturbing domestic trends from a bioterrorism perspective in light of existing U.S. 
bioterrorism policy is necessary to understand the cause and effect relationship that can 
have implications for years to come. The first chapter analyzes the major implications of 
the bioterrorism policies of the Bush and Obama administrations. Historically, the Bush 
administration took the stance that a biological attack would occur and sought to lessen 
the effects of such an event emphasizing an area termed “biodefense”. The Obama 
administration policy sought to prevent an attack from occurring utilizing proactive 
measures, placing more importance on an area termed “biosecurity”. The chapter uses the 
lens of the shift in policies between the two administrations to discuss the rise of 
leaderless resistance terrorist activity, showing a relationship between the years the trend 
began and the change in administrations.  
Each of the administrations’ bioterrorism policies are then analyzed in terms of 
research capabilities, role of law enforcement, data sharing, and the role of international 
actors to identify whether the leaderless resistance trend shaped policy decisions. Case 
studies of bioterrorism incidents in the United States produced over the course of both 
administrations are also analyzed to provide examples of changing attitudes and beliefs 
regarding bioterrorism. Overall, the leaderless resistance trend had some effects on U.S. 
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bioterrorism policy but it appears that ideological differences between the two 
administrations played a much larger role in the changes to bioterrorism policy from 
2003 to 2014.   
The second chapter asks how known features of state-sponsored BW programs 
can help produce a framework for predicting possible future threats to the United States. 
The real and looming biological agent threat has been continuously overlooked at the 
state level even as states cross “red lines” of international norms concerning weapons. 
The chapter takes a look at historical BW programs established after the United States 
relinquished its BW and joined the BWC. These historical states are referred to as 
“rogue” to explain their role as contention states within a U.S. led world order, at least at 
the time of their BW development. These states include Russia (USSR), South Africa, 
and Iraq. These states are used as historical examples through which the chapter identifies 
patterns in potentially future rogue state BW behavior. Various aspects of these states, 
both benign and threatening, such as Gross Domestic Product, Freedom of the Press 
rating, Political Terror rating, and infant mortality rates are analyzed and the outcomes 
are recorded. The outcomes, or patterns, are tested against a list of possible present-day 
threat states: non-signatory states to the BWC, non-ratifying states to the BWC, and 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) WMD threat states. With the use of the historical 
state patterns, a short list of possible future state threats emerge, to include China, Egypt, 
Israel, and Myanmar. After the quantitative analysis was performed, potential future state 
threats were revealed to share several common characteristics: lower levels of 
democracy, lower press freedom ratings, high political terror ratings, and moderate levels 
of received arms transfers. All in all, without follow-up reports that these countries do in 
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fact have BW programs, it is impossible to tell if the methodology was successful but this 
quantitative approach provides a blueprint for future threat-based analysis concerning 
state BW, a topic that has been sorely overlooked in academic literature.  
The third and final chapter asks why the United States has refused to sign onto the 
verification protocol of the BWC considering its track record with signing international 
arms agreements and its push for the protocol pre-2001. The core failure of the 
verification protocol (VEREX) for the BWC continues to be a major obstacle to dealing 
with the threat of bioterrorism and BW at an international level. Greater attention must be 
paid to the motivations for the U.S. refusal as well as credible options for the future. The 
history of the BWC and VEREX are detailed for the reader, including the dual-use issue 
of scientific endeavors such as biodefense programs. The publicized reasons behind the 
U.S. refusal of the protocol are discussed at length, as is the U.S. history concerning the 
signing of international arms agreements. Case studies of China and Russia, who have 
also cast doubt on the protocol, are used to attempt to unveil additional motivations for a 
U.S. refusal to sign. Overall, the refusal of VEREX is directly tied to the statements and 
actions of other BWC participating states like Russia and China, overriding the desire for 
an international partnership and previous arms agreement patterns. In lieu of VEREX, the 
United States has a variety of policy options to choose from, with domestic based 
programs being the strongest contenders to battle this issue.  
 Overall, the biological threat to the United States is one that must be looked at 
through several lenses to truly understand its complexity. This thesis aims to provide 
clarity and to encourage academic as well as policy discussion about a “non-traditional” 
threat to the United States and ways that it can be combated.  
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Chapter 1: A New Face of Bioterrorism: Leaderless Resistance and its Effects on 
U.S. Policy 
 
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, Americans feared that the U.S. would be 
attacked again on a larger scale. The anthrax attacks, which occurred only days after the 
9/11 attacks, appeared to verify that fear and set the American public further on edge.  
This bioterrorism attack was the most complex Americans had ever seen and the country 
was extremely unprepared. U.S. policy on bioterrorism began to shift after the anthrax 
attacks, but momentum was lost as the country dealt with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
as well as the failing domestic economy. During this time, major changes to the terrorism 
landscape on a global scale began to take place and the threat started to reemerge. 
One of the major changes that occurred within the terrorism environment was the 
shift of al Qaeda from a structured organization to a more fragmented one. Since 2011 al 
Qaeda has suffered extreme blows to their structure and operations. The loss of Osama 
bin Laden and drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan have severely affected their mission 
to attack the United States on a larger scale. Terrorist groups such as al Qaeda-affiliate al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have been using publications since 2010 to 
influence those not affiliated with the organization to carry out jihad by themselves. This 
method of radicalization gave rise to multiple domestic attacks by individuals or small 
groups, seemingly unaffiliated with a larger organization. This leaderless resistance 
movement is on the rise with warnings coming in throughout the U.S. law enforcement 
community. Due to the fact that a bioterrorism attack has been viewed by many in 
leadership positions within the government as something that will occur again, the 
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leaderless resistance trend may have had an increased impact on the U.S. bioterrorism 
strategy as U.S. law enforcement attempts to deal with this major change.1 
 This chapter investigates how the leaderless resistance movement has shaped U.S. 
bioterrorism policy. The past policies concerning the U.S. bioterrorism strategy will be 
discussed in terms of the stance taken by the Bush administration. This prior policy will 
be compared and contrasted with the new policies of the Obama administration. An 
analysis of the leaderless resistance trend, coupled with changes in the bioterrorism 
policy, reveals a partial correlation between the two administrations. The depth of this 
relationship will be investigated through a literature review of the leaderless resistance 
movement and changes in the U.S. bioterrorism strategy. The different strategies will also 
be analyzed within the scope of research capabilities, role of law enforcement, data 
sharing, and the role of international actors. A case study of U.S. bioterrorism incidents 
bridging through both administrations will also be conducted to analyze the relationship 
and the scope of changes that took place. Overall, while the leaderless resistance 
movement has caused some changes to U.S. bioterrorism policies, the changes in 
Presidential administrations - and the accompanying political priority shifts - have played 
a much larger role. 
U.S. Bioterrorism Strategy Before Leaderless Resistance Trend Began 
 The U.S. bioterrorism strategy before the anthrax attacks in 2001 was severely 
limited in terms of overall capabilities and efforts to detect and prevent a bioterrorism 
attack. Limited surveillance measures existed as well as a very small number of prepared 
hospitals and medical centers ready to respond to biological weapons (BW) attacks. Until 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 U.S. Congressional Research Service, Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of Bioterrorism: Selected 
Issues for Congress (R41123; Aug. 6, 2010), by Frank Gottron and Dana A. Shea. 
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the anthrax attacks, no system was in place to distribute the necessary vaccines or 
medical treatments for victims of an attack and first responders.2 In 2004, the Bush 
administration developed a bioterrorism strategy aimed at preparedness after the anthrax 
attacks. In this policy, Bush stated that medical and public health programs had been 
revitalized and expanded. A stockpile of smallpox vaccines was also included in the 
improved medical programs.3 This stockpiling effort has been praised by some as a 
success story in the fight to protect U.S. citizens, but there are concerns that stockpiles 
such as these have lost “importance” in the eyes of new policy makers.4 A greater 
importance was also placed on developing biosurveillance programs such as Bioshield 
and Biosense to detect “early indicators of a biological attack.”5  
The Department of Homeland Security was tasked with coordination of the 
various pillars of the Bush strategy, in conjunction with the Department of State.6 Bush 
also placed a higher importance on preplanning by different government agencies to 
coordinate emergency protocols. Within this preplanning sector he spoke of “working to 
improve the survivability and ensure the continuity and restoration of operations.”7 The 
Bush administration placed greater importance on the fact that a BW attack would occur, 
unlike his predecessors who placed more importance on threats from traditional methods 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Crystal Franco and Mary B. Hansen, “The State of Biopreparedness: Lessons from Leaders, Proposals for 
Progress,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 8, no. 4 (2010): 380. 
3 George W. Bush, Biodefense for the 21st Century, (Washington, DC: White House, 2004), 2. 
4 James Glassman, "We're Letting Our Bioterrorism Defenses Down," Forbes, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesglassman/2012/04/04/were-letting-our-bioterrorism-defenses-down/ 
(accessed April 28, 2014). 
5 Anne L Clunan, “Building Information Networks for Biosecurity,” in Terrorism, War, or Disease?, eds. 
Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2008), 296. 
6 Biodefense: Next Steps, Senate Hearing (February 8, 2005) (statement of Dr. Penrose C. Albright, 
Department of Homeland Security, Assistant Under Secretary for Science and Technology).	  
7 Bush, Biodefense for the 21st Century, 5. 
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of warfare. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks gave way to a response 
tactic known as biodefense by the Bush administration.  
 After seeing the long, drawn out case of the anthrax attacks the Bush 
administration looked to develop the bioforensic capabilities of the United States. These 
capabilities would enable scientists and law enforcement to determine the source of a 
specific pathogen in order to respond adequately.8 This type of investigative technique is 
what lead law enforcement, after years of research, to Bruce Ivans as the anthrax attacker. 
The anthrax attacks also revealed the loose regulations and protocol for decontamination 
after a BW event. Millions of dollars were spent and multiple offices were shut down to 
remove anthrax spores from the premises. The Bush administration stated that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would be placed in charge of developing the 
decontamination procedures to allow agencies to return to regular operations as soon as 
possible.9 New labs were also ordered to be built to develop adequate vaccines and 
countermeasures to quickly respond to an attack. These labs were developed to “evaluate 
existing, proposed, or promising countermeasures” to a BW attack.10 This defensive 
strategy, some scholars argue, lead to an even greater availability of BW in labs. The 
Bush administration did not include “provisions for addressing the problem of what 
happens when a ‘good’ researcher goes ‘bad’.”11 A massive expansion of BW researchers 
wasn’t the only issue with the Bush administration policy. In addition to the 
aforementioned problems, the administration also failed to place significant importance 
on the international community to prevent a bioterrorism or BW attack. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 6. 
9 Ibid., 8. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Gregory D. Koblentz, “From Biodefense to Biosecurity: the Obama Administration’s Strategy for 
Countering Biological Threats,” International Affairs 88, no, I (2012): 142. 
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 Gregory Koblentz, Deputy Director of the Biodefense program at George Mason 
University, argues that the Bush administration bioterrorism strategy almost exclusively 
discussed domestic preparedness and response, while ignoring the importance of 
international partners. The highest priority for the administration was the domestic threat 
of a disease outbreak caused by terrorists.12 International public health issues mainly 
involved the HIV/AIDS and SARS outbreaks, overlooking the role that other states play 
in bioterrorism threats. In July 2001, the Bush Administration forced a suspension of the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) after it was asked to sign onto a verification 
protocol that would legally bind American biodefense programs to greater investigation 
and inspection.13 This forced suspension solidified the Bush administration stance on 
bioterrorism as a domestic threat due to the fact that the administration continued to 
attend meetings - but only when global health issues were discussed.14 Many also saw 
this approach as predictable and understandable especially after 9/11 and the anthrax 
attacks. Given that the United States had very little biodefense structures actually in 
place, the “first level” of change required dealing with basic domestic obstacles such as 
“funding, augmenting personnel, and reorganization.”15 Overall, the Bush 
administration’s focus on biodefense centered on preparedness and a domestic threat 
response. Years after Bush announced this strategy, a growing trend in terrorism began to 
emerge. This trend, leaderless resistance, would test the very the limits of the U.S. 
terrorism policy in general and give way to new threats to the security of an already 
vulnerable nation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 137. 
13 Clunan, “Building Information Networks for Biosecurity,” 302. 
14 Koblentz, “From Biodefense to Biosecurity,” 137. 
15 Richard Danzig, "A Decade of Countering Bioterrorism: Incremental Progress, Fundamental Failings," 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 10, no. 1 (2012): 50. 
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The Leaderless Resistance Movement 
 Jeffrey Kaplan notes that the present day idea of the leaderless resistance 
movement can be defined as, “a kind of lone wolf operation in which an individual, or a 
very small, highly cohesive group, engage in acts of anti-state violence independent of 
any movement, leader or network of support.”16 The idea of leaderless resistance became 
popular in the 1980s with radical right wing groups who were attempting to resuscitate 
their dying organizations.17 White separatists have the most experience to draw from 
concerning the leaderless resistance structure. While the leaderless resistance method was 
used in the past by these organizations, it was not always successful. Members had 
difficulty acquiring adequate information about the movement without direct contact with 
a particular organization.18 Marc Sageman, who specializes in research regarding 
leaderless jihad, argues that it is a sub-sect of the leaderless resistance movement and is a 
key concern for U.S. officials. The introduction of the Internet ushered in a new 
incarnation of the leaderless resistance movement. The terrorist attacks in Casablanca, 
Madrid, and London were the first type of leaderless resistance type attacks involving 
violent Islamists.19 The small groups involved in these attacks did not have any ties to the 
al Qaeda organization. They were only influenced by the speeches given by al Qaeda 
leaders and Internet postings supporting the Jihadist movement.20 One such example, 
scholars argue, are the postings of Mustafa Setmariam Nasar who made several postings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Jeffrey Kaplan, “Leaderless Resistance,” In Inside Terrorist Organizations, edited by David C. 
Rappaport, (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 260. 
17 Ibid., 261. 
18 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Gruen, “Leadership vs. Leaderless Resistance: The Militant 
White Separatist Movement’s Operating Model,” 18 Feb. 2010, 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/leadership-vs-leaderless-resistance-the-militant-white-
separatist-movement (24 Feb. 2012). 
19 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 133. 
20 Ibid., 139. 
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about the need to “rise up” in Iraq by forming “individual groups” to fight against the 
Iraqi and American security forces.21  
Internet postings by al Qaeda, including Inspire magazine, have provided even the 
most uneducated and under supplied individual with an opportunity to carry out an attack 
against the United States. The 2013 Boston Marathon bombers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev were motivated to carry out the attack through postings tied to Inspire magazine 
and even found background information about how to build their pressure cooker bombs 
from it as well.22 Other leaderless resistance attacks on the United States involved Nidal 
Malik Hassan at Fort Hood and Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, who fired at U.S. 
military recruitment stations and was later arrested next to the Pentagon.23 The cases were 
not the first time that this type of “lone wolf” threat was discussed by law enforcement. 
Statements by former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano and former 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, Robert Mueller, pointed to the growing 
threat of these unaffiliated individuals in 2011 and 2013.24 Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de 
Graaf discuss this growing threat in discussing the counterterrorism approach to the lone 
wolf terrorism trend. Bakker and de Graff also suggest that the threat is not limited to 
individuals influenced by al Qaeda or the general jihadist movement but that it could also 
involve right wing extremists and separatists like it did in the 1980s. In January 2014, 
two Georgia men were found guilty of possession of a biological toxin for use as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al 
Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, (2007): 10.  
22 Anthony Lemieux, Jarret Brachman, Jason Levitt, and Jay Wood, "Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis 
of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral 
Skills Model," Terrorism and Political Violence (2014): 2. 
23 Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf, “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: some CT approaches 
discussed,” Perspective on Terrorism 5, no. 5-6 (2011): 44. 
24 Risa A. Brooks, “Muslim “Homegrown” Terrorism in the United States,” International Security 36, no, 2 
(2011): 8. 
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weapon.25 In November 2011, the men were arrested for plotting a ricin attack on federal 
officials. They were influenced by information they found online about U.S. citizens 
attacking government officials through rudimentary research of using caster beans to 
make ricin, a toxin.26 This case opens the door to a new aspect of the leaderless resistance 
trend, bioterrorism. 
Aside from several reports, many scholars think that the still relatively small 
number of leaderless resistance type attacks make up a tiny fraction of total casualties 
linked to terror attacks.27 Sageman argues that the uptick in attacks in notable, but the 
leaderless resistance movement requires a “constant stream of new violent attacks to hold 
the interest of potential newcomers to the movement.”28 The necessity would eventually 
lead to the demise of the movement but no one is sure about how long that downward 
trend would take and what would be there to replace it. To contrast this argument, a 2013 
quantitative study by the International Institute for Counter-terrorism, utilizing data from 
START (the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism), RAND, and various news outlets, determined that the “United States has the 
highest level of lone wolf terrorism” and that the “total number of incidents in the United 
States – and in the Western world in general – is increasing.”29 This growing trend of 
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leaderless resistance has also led to the bigger question about its potential ties to 
bioterrorism. 
Leaderless Resistance and Bioterrorism 
The increase in visibility of the leaderless resistance, or lone actor, threat brings 
attention to lone actor attempts to acquire BW agents and if they even have the capability 
to carry out a bioterrorism attack. A conventional weapon attack is consistently seen as a 
more probable occurrence by those who argue lone actors and bioterrorism are not a true 
threat.30  In a 2014 report by START it was revealed that jihadists groups, disgruntled 
actors, and domestic right-wing groups were all flagged for presenting a “significant CB 
[chemical or biological] threat to the United States within the next decade” when 
analyzed with both qualitative and quantitative methods.31 In addition, “rapid and often 
discontinuous advances in technological development” have presented a new range of 
possibilities for the lone actor CBRN threat. Acquisition could become easier, simplified 
technological processes could make footprints less visible, and technology could help 
avoid detection because testing can be done virtually.32 The technological trends, coupled 
with detailed analyses of lone actor capabilities and intentions, highlight the connection 
between leaderless resistance and bioterrorism. Overall, the leaderless resistance trend 
began to pick up in the United States around 2008, just as the Obama administration 
released a new approach to the growing problem of bioterrorism. 
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U.S. Bioterrorism Strategy After Leaderless Resistance Trend Began 
 The election of Barack Obama to the presidency led to a shift in the U.S. 
bioterrorism strategy. This strategy shift cannot be exclusively tied to Obama taking 
office, due to the changing trends in U.S. security as noted with the leaderless resistance 
trend. Obama’s strategy focused on the prevention aspect of bioterrorism and BW use. 
The strategy changes are an attempt to influence not only the intent but also the capability 
of actors.33  
The intent of actors to develop BW is an important aspect of Obama’s strategy. 
The use of domestic laboratory security is also a major part of the strategy to control the 
distribution and number of “high-risk pathogens and toxins.”34 Partnerships with the 
laboratory community can help influence those who have intentions to attack the United 
States with BW. A “culture of responsibility” in the life sciences field is also noted as a 
change in the bioterrorism strategy.35 The administration notes the important role of life 
scientists who hold onto sensitive information that could be used for good or evil. 
Positive norms are of the utmost importance for the U.S. bioterrorism strategy in order to 
maintain a global awareness to prevent the use of biological weapons for terrorism and 
death.  
 Policies that respond to the capabilities of actors also play a large role in the 
Obama strategy. The 2009 bioterrorism strategy aims to provide biosecurity rather than 
biodefense, as seen in the 2004 strategy. While a biosecurity-focused policy aims to 
prevent a biological attack before it occurs, a biodefense-focused policy aims to deal with 
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the aftermath of a BW attack through medical care and military responses. This 
prevention takes place through coordination with various actors to reduce the overall 
threat. Data sharing with federal, state, local, and international law enforcement is 
highlighted in the policy.36 This sharing of information could assist in the aftermath of an 
attack by ensuring that law enforcement can work closely with medical professionals to 
lessen the effects of an attack as well as locate the perpetrator.  
The emphasis of biosecurity also ties into the role of common citizens to report 
suspicious activity. Mass orders of suspicious chemicals or suspicious behavior by a 
coworker in a lab who has access to high-level toxins can be the first steps in combating 
bioterrorism.37 The use of microbial forensics to decipher the biological source of an 
attack is also noted as requiring extensive federal research to bolster the field in itself.38 
The global knowledge of microbial forensics can deter actors plotting a bioterrorism 
attack, therefore influencing them to not utilize their capabilities. Lastly, in terms of 
biosecurity, the administration notes that the intelligence community must play a greater 
role in vetting valuable intelligence that is gathered domestically but internationally as 
well to thwart an attack.39 All of these elements within biosecurity-focused policy are 
designed to reduce the overall treat of bioterrorism by monitoring signs of intentions to 
cause harm and considerably limiting the capabilities of those looking to launch an 
attack. 
 The major enhancement of the U.S. bioterrorism strategy under Obama is the 
inclusion of the international community. The security of U.S. labs containing high-risk 
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toxins is only a small part of the equation of the bioterrorism threat. Partnerships with the 
global community assist in greatly diminishing the capabilities of actors looking to 
launch a bioterrorism attack not only in the United States, but in other countries as well. 
Some labs in other states simply do not possess the technology, intelligence, and 
oversight needed to adequately safeguard BW and toxins. Koblentz argues that the new 
strategy highlights the importance of empowering other states to implement advances 
security measures for the biological agents.40 The importance of the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) is also noted in the new strategy, which pushes for greater 
involvement in the international community than in the Bush administration policy.41 
While the Obama administration has not made a promise to pursue the previously 
rejected protocol, the United States did send in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to 
address the BWC in 2011. This inclusion is a sign of respect and importance that the 
United States has made towards the BWC members.42  
Similarities Between Old and New U.S. Bioterrorism Strategies 
 While the two strategies have different emphasis, biodefense and biosecurity, they 
share certain similarities. It is important to note that many of the experts used by 
President Bush in 2004 to draft his strategy were also used in 2009 with the Obama 
administration. Both Bush and Obama stated that law enforcement agencies at every level 
had to be able to communicate effectively about the current threats. Both Bush and 
Obama also discussed adequate vaccine availability, with an emphasis placed on a rapid 
response by healthcare facilities. A detailed analysis of federal biodefense budgets 
released for fiscal years 2001 to 2014 also revealed that on average, both administrations 
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have allocated $5.5 to $5.9 billion per year to both biodefense and indirect biodefense 
measures. Allocations of strictly biodefense related funding decreased with the start of 
the Obama Administration but legacy detection systems such as Bioshield, continue to be 
funded.43 Overall, the two policies shared many common arguments but also many 
differences concerning how to handle this growing threat. 
Policy Implications Concerning Leaderless Resistance Trend 
Research Capabilities 
 The research capabilities concerning bioterrorism have greatly improved since 
2001. It no longer takes years to pin down the origin of a toxin and/or BW due to the 
advances in microbial forensics. The Amerithrax investigation took a total of seven years 
to attribute the particular anthrax spores used to the specific strand of anthrax studied by 
Bruce Ivans, an anthrax researcher at the Army laboratory in Maryland.44 This attribution 
process has improved greatly in order to rapidly identify and apprehend the perpetrators 
of a BW attack.45 The leaderless resistance trend has increased the need for this type of 
research to discern the source of a bioterrorism attack before more attacks can occur. Due 
to the low level of detection involved with leaderless resistance attacks, it is very 
probable that an individual or small group could carry out successive attacks over a long 
period of time without the fear of attribution. The public knowledge of this type of 
research could possibly be a deterrent to potential leaderless terrorists who would be less 
likely to carry out multiple attacks due to the short time to attribute the attack. Research 
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capabilities, such as microbial forensics, have understandably improved due to advances 
in scientific research but they have been affected by the shift in the threat overall.  
Role of Law Enforcement 
 The role of law enforcement has changed considerably since the rise of leaderless 
resistance. State and local law enforcement were used as the “foot soldiers” against the 
threat of terrorism for the federal law enforcement agencies before the trend began. The 
rise of leaderless resistance invariably led to detection methods being used by local law 
enforcement to pick up on suspicious behaviors in the community and share that 
information with their federal counterparts. The leaderless resistance model does not fit 
into previous ideas of a terrorist. Lone wolves and the like “usually avoid contact with 
others.”46 This cut-off in communication has made traditional detection methods 
obsolete. A closer relationship with local communities is of growing importance as these 
are the individuals most likely to detect a negative shift in the behavior of one of its 
inhabitants. Those partaking in leaderless resistance do give off signals, but they are often 
shrouded by an attempt to portray a normal life. In terms of bioterrorism, these 
individuals could easily go undetected as they build or acquire BW. Engaging with those 
working in facilities with access to biological agents is key to detecting this new type of 
radicalization. Federal law enforcement has begun a relationship with the scientific 
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Data Sharing 
 The role of data sharing has changed considerably since the trend in leaderless 
resistance came about. Sharing of information with the scientific community was 
virtually non-existent due to a high level of mistrust between the government and 
scientists working in high-risk labs. Greater communication is now present concerning 
government bodies, such as the FBI, and the scientific community. The FBI’s WMD 
Coordinators, in each of the 56 field offices, engage with local scientists and populations 
to build relationships and deter threats. This open relationship has helped the government 
gather important information about scientific advances concerning biological weapons 
and disseminate it to the proper agencies in order to keep the public safe.48 Obama’s 2012 
National Strategy for Biosurveillance also highlighted that there would be an increase in 
fusion centers for law enforcement, intelligence, and scientific information to meld 
together in order to fully integrate “biosurveillance capabilities.”49 
Role of International Actors 
The risk of a leaderless attack is one shared by many different countries and not 
just the United States. A new level of engagement with the international community has 
been introduced in order to mitigate the threat of a leaderless individual or small group 
getting their hands on BW. Prior to the rise in attacks, the United States was very closed 
off from the rest of the international community concerning BW. The new openness, as 
seen with the State Department and Department of Defense bioengagement programs,  
enables the United States to share vital scientific and law enforcement information to 
other countries in order to secure their own biological agents and instill the appropriate 
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detection systems needed to mitigate this type of threat. Maintenance of a “global health 
perspective” was highlighted in Obama’s 2012 biosurveillance strategy as key for future 
success noting that a “network of information nodes” will continue to enhance not only 
U.S. domestic security but international security as a whole.50  
Hypothesis concerning Leaderless Resistance and U.S. Bioterrorism Strategy 
 There is not a large amount of academic literature on leaderless resistance relating 
to U.S. policy but the changes in U.S. policy since 2001 coincide with the changing 
terrorism environment within the United States. The evidence will be able to demonstrate 
a trend between the growing number of leaderless resistance attacks and arrests in the 
United States and the changing of the U.S. bioterrorism strategy. While a variety of 
factors have contributed to the change in strategy, the research will likely show that the 
leaderless resistance aspect has had one of the greatest impacts on the U.S. bioterrorism 
strategy due to the decentralized nature of the threat.  
Bioterrorism Case Studies 
 There have been many bioterrorism arrests and investigations in the past decade 
that help to elaborate on the shift to leaderless resistance. A distinct pattern presents itself 
when an analysis of these cases is carried out. The pattern illustrates the change in the 
type of cases that were observed during this time period. An analysis of cases prior to the 
rise of leaderless resistance and of those since the rise will be analyzed in terms of 
research capabilities at the time, the role of law enforcement, data sharing, and the role of 
international actors.  
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Case Studies Before the Rise of Leaderless Resistance 
 In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, a new threat emerged for 
the American public. This case would ultimately change U.S. bioterrorism policy in 
every way imaginable. On September 18, 2001 and October 9, 2001 five letters were 
mailed to the AMI building in Florida, NBC Studios and New York Post in New York 
City, and to the offices of Senators Daschle and Leahy in Washington, DC. All five of 
these letters were laced with 1-2 grams of anthrax, a lethal biological agent.51 A total of 
22 people were sickened after they came in contact with the powdery substance inside of 
the envelopes. Five people later died who were infected with the respiratory form, which 
is far deadlier than its skin counterpart.52 Shortly after the death of the first victim an 
autopsy revealed that anthrax was the cause of death. The Amerithrax case is a pillar 
within the group of cases that took place between 2001 and 2008. Within these cases key 
components will be analyzed and compared to their counterparts that took place from 
2008 to 2014. 
Research Capabilities pre-Leaderless Resistance 
 The Amerithrax investigation was the first of its kind in the U.S., propelling the 
need for adequate research methods to detect the source of a biological weapon. The time 
period of investigation for the Amerithrax case took a staggering 9 years to complete.  
During the initial years of the investigation, the FBI considered Steven Hatfill, a 
virologist, the primary suspect in the case. After further investigation it was determined 
that Bruce Ivans, an anthrax researcher as the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 
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Infectious Diseases in Maryland, was the primary suspect.53 Ivans’ access to the specific 
strand of anthrax used and his activities leading up to and after the attacks led 
investigators to name him as the only suspect. The FBI tied Ivans to the specific strand of 
the agent after years of microbial forensic investigation, which was the first such use of 
this new technology.54 It is important to note, however, that this technology was 
introduced later on in the investigation; therefore, a portion of the advancement took 
place during the “Leaderless Resistance” time period. 
 The lag in investigative techniques was also seen in another case in 2001, the case 
of Kenneth Olsen. Just weeks before the September 11th attacks, an employee at Agilent 
Technologies in Washington state was alarmed when they picked up a print job detailing 
how to construct a bomb.  It was later determined that Kenneth Olsen, an employee at 
Agilent Technologies Inc in Washington state, printed the document. A coworker of 
Olsen notified management who promptly fired Olsen and contacted authorities. Within 
Olsen’s desk at work were various books on how to commit murder.  His belongings 
were subsequently sent off to a lab to be tested. Months later, most likely due to the mass 
panic in the law enforcement community after the 9/11 and anthrax attacks, officials were 
notified that Olsen’s belongings tested positive for ricin. Olsen was later convicted of 
producing and possessing the deadly ricin toxin but serious implications could have 
occurred due to the slow process of testing his belongings.55  These implications are 
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further discussed in the following paragraph which discusses the case of the “Fallen 
Angel.” 
 A few years later the lack of research capabilities would rear its ugly head again. 
In October 2003, a package was hand delivered to a mail sorting facility near the 
Greenville-Spartanburg International Airport in South Carolina. Inside the package was a 
letter and a vial with a label stating “Caution ricin poison enclosed in sealed container. 
Do not open without proper protection.”56 The letter threatened to dump ricin into the 
water supply if mandated sleeping regulations for long haul truck drivers were not 
recalled. The writing stated that the person who wrote the letter was the head of fleet for a 
tanking company and signed the bottom of the letter, “Fallen Angel”. No one knew who 
could have delivered the package to the facility and within a month another letter 
appeared at a mailing facility at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC. The package 
contained the same type of message, with a vial of ricin, and was signed by “Fallen 
Angel”. The perpetrator of the packages was never found due to the lack of evidence 
found in the packages.57 At the time microbial forensics did not exist, which implies that 
had the research abilities been present, “Fallen Angel” could have been brought to 
justice.  
 Perhaps one of the cases that hit close to home for many in Washington D.C. was 
the Bill Frist Senate mailings. An alert was issued in February 2004 after ricin was 
discovered in a letter-opening machine in the Dirksen Office Building that handled mail 
for Senator Bill Frist’s office. Investigators sorted through “20,000 pieces of mail” to find 
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the source of the toxin.58 They could not find the source envelope and no other piece of 
mail contained the toxin. Air filters were searched as well as other surfaces such as 
doorknobs and windowsills. Investigators determined that the ricin “was mostly paper 
dust, with traces of ricin so minute, they can’t be evaluated for particle size or purity.”59 
Samples could have been gathered from several staffers that had come in contact with the 
mail sorter, enabling more elaborate research, based on what was available at the time.  
Research capabilities aren’t the only aspect of these cases that requires analysis. 
The role of law enforcement has also changed greatly based on what can be inferred from 
the review of these cases; this change will be discussed in the following section. 
The Role of Law Enforcement pre-Leaderless Resistance 
 Mass confusion ensued after the Amerithrax attacks. Several government agencies 
opened cases and spent millions of dollars investigating the attack. No solid policy had 
been created that established duties for each of the agencies to take on if such an attack 
occurred. The FBI took hold of the case eventually but years were wasted investigating 
the wrong person, Steven Hatfill. Eventual teaming with the scientific community lead to 
the discovery of Bruce Ivans but shortly before his would-be indictment in 2008, Ivans 
committed suicide. The formal investigation was officially closed on February 19, 2010 
with the FBI maintaining that Ivans was the culprit.60  
In terms of the Kenneth Olsen case, law enforcement was pulled into the situation 
as soon as the management at Olsen’s company filed a complaint. After gathering 
evidence from Olsen’s desk, officials sent the samples to a lab to be tested. Mass hysteria 
after 9/11 led to law enforcement officials assigned to the case to lag behind in getting the 
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adequate results. Law enforcement was also tasked to track down the truck that delivered 
the “Fallen Angel” letter in South Carolina, due to the statement in the letter that the 
perpetrator was a truck driver. The suspect was never identified and mailed yet another 
package that left law enforcement officials baffled.  
In January 2005 a 22-year-old waiter was arrested after a telephone tipster 
revealed that he possessed weapons and poisons. In Steven Michael Ekberg’s bedroom 
investigators discovered a vial with a “brown granular substance” that later tested 
positive for ricin as well as castor beans.61 Ekberg also possessed several weapons 
including an AK-47 and an Uzi. The tipster, who later became a confidential informant, 
told authorities that Ekberg had shown the toxin to him months prior to the phone call 
reporting his behavior. He stated, while picking up one of the containers that, “If I put 
this in your food, this would kill you immediately.”62 The confidential source also stated 
that Ekberg expressed, “If the government ever did anything to him, he would take some 
sort of action.”63 Ekberg’s mother stated that he suffered from depression and the FBI 
stated at the time of his arrest that they did not believe he had any ties to terrorists or 
extremists. Ekberg entered a guilty plea in May 2005 and received an unspecified 
sentence, per federal guidelines. The Ekberg case revealed a slight shift in the role of law 
enforcement. A source, not affiliated with law enforcement, contacted officials 
concerning Ekberg “showing off” deadly toxins as well as a barrage of weapons. The 
source was later developed into a confidential informant, revealing more detail about 
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what he or she saw in Ekberg’s home.  
Data Sharing pre-Leaderless Resistance 
 The Amerithrax attack, in addition to 9/11, was an embarrassment for the law 
enforcement community as a lack of cooperation was apparent between agencies. 
Coordination began to take place between several government agencies including the 
U.S. Postal Service, FBI, and the Center for Disease Control (CDC). These agencies were 
unprepared to coordinate such a large and constantly developing case. Due to the fact that 
the attacks took place over several weeks, the agencies struggled to form a central 
strategy. Ultimately the FBI took control of the case for many years in order to find the 
culprit but had the various agencies shared information, the likelihood of Ivins being 
identified as the culprit much earlier is high. A lag in data sharing was also seen in the 
Olsen case as a large chunk of time passed before the test results were even revealed to 
law enforcement personnel.  
 The Senate mail room incident also revealed a lack in information sharing. For 
hours staffers came and went out of the “contaminated” area as the investigation took 
place. Conflicting reports also surfaced about the safety procedures that were in place for 
an attack such as this one. Several staffers stated that they were told to go home, without 
a health screening or biological decontamination shower. Later on in the day the staffers 
that were still present were required to go through a decontamination shower built in the 
hallway of the building. No one followed through with procedures to inform the office 
about what to do in the event of an attack and at the time the suspect could have even 
been in the building.64 All persons present in the building at the time of the discovery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Ryan and Glarum, "Case Studies," 147. 
	   27 
should have been screened for exposure, if not to discover the culprit, but to protect the 
American public from being contaminated.  
The Role of International Actors pre-Leaderless Resistance 
 The international community was pulled into the Amerithrax investigation when 
the FBI took primary control of the investigation. Over the years the investigation spread 
to approximately 10,000 witness interviews on six different continents.65 Prior to this part 
of the Amerithrax investigation, the U.S. was cut off from the international community in 
terms of bioterrorism threat reduction.  
Case Studies During the Rise of Leaderless Resistance 
 Around 2008 the trend in bioterrorism incidents began to change. Those arrested 
began to show more radical beliefs and exhibit more structured experiments with deadly 
agents. The most disturbing of bioterrorism arrests was the apprehension of four older 
men in Georgia. The men were arrested relating to charges of “plans to obtain an 
unregistered explosive device…and to manufacture the biological toxin ricin for use in 
attacks against other U.S. citizens and government personnel and officials.”66 All four of 
the men were members of a “fringe militia group” aimed to overturn the U.S. government 
and two of them were found guilty in 2014 of possessing a biological toxin with intent to 
use it as a weapon.67 An analysis of these cases from 2008 to 2014 will be performed 
through a breakdown of important policy elements. 
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Research Capabilities During Leaderless Resistance Trend 
 As noted in the previous section, the Amerithrax investigation ushered in a new 
type of research concerning bioterrorism, microbial forensics. Due to the fact that the 
investigation overlapped into the leaderless resistance time period it should be noted as 
an improved capability that came about at the very end of the pre-leaderless resistance 
time period. While research capabilities have changed considerably since early 2000, 
some of the most notable changes took place with the other policy elements.  
The Role of Law Enforcement During Leaderless Resistance Trend 
Law enforcement took on a new role during the leaderless resistance movement as 
detection became complicated due to the “lone wolf” mindset to decrease communication 
to lessen the chances of being detected. The most prominent instance of this would be the 
2011 arrests in Georgia. A confidential source attended the meetings where the men 
discussed their plan to attack government officials and their buildings, in addition to the 
local police, through the use of explosive devices and silencers. The men did state that 
they knew the actions would be considered murder during the militia meetings but they 
“reasoned that the actions were necessary in accordance with their ideology.”68 Two of 
the men, Thomas and Roberts, described a friend of theirs to the source stating that the 
friend had manufactured ricin and had access to castor beans to produce it. During one of 
the meetings, one of the men stated that he wanted to produce 10 pounds of ricin to 
release in various U.S. cities. He described that the toxin could be released into the air 
from a moving vehicle on the interstate to spread the toxin further. This confidential 
source provided a wealth of knowledge about the inner workings of the militia group and 
the expertise that its members brought to the table. Without the use of this source, it was 
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very unlikely that law enforcement would have been able to get the evidence they needed 
to convict the subjects. 
Law enforcement was challenged with ricin letters for the first time since the 
2003 and 2004 mailings in 2013. Shortly after the 2013 Boston Bombings several letters 
laced with ricin were sent to politicians, sending the public into a panic. In April 2013 J. 
Everett Dutschke of Mississippi mailed three ricin-laced letters to President Obama, 
Senator Roger Wicker, and a Mississippi judge.69 Only a month later Texas actress 
Shannon Guess Richardson mailed three letters to President Obama, Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg, and Mark Glaze.70 Both Dutschke and Richardson attempted to frame other 
individuals for their crimes but law enforcement worked to ensure the toxin was 
attributed to the correct people. Dutschke included phrases commonly used by his 
adversary, Paul Kevin Curtis, is his letters but eventually pled guilty to several charges 
including developing a biological agent and mailing threatening letters to the President.71 
Richardson approached law enforcement days after the letters were mailed to state that 
her husband was the culprit but suspicions quickly turned to her when law enforcement 
further analyzed the letters. Months later Richardson pled guilty to mailing the letters 
herself.72 
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Law enforcement also shifted to be more aware of suspicious occurrences within 
the scientific community. In December 2011, a sheriff in Texas pulled over Karl 
Jasheway for suspected drunk driving but came across something more incriminating in 
the back seat of Jasheway’s car. Jasheway had thirteen vials of chemicals and various 
pieces of lab equipment from University of Texas-Austin, where he was conducting 
research as part of his graduate studies. In January 2012, Jasheway’s home was searched 
and an additional 44 tubes of chemicals were found. Shortly after this discovery, he 
became a target for a federal investigation. Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 
ensuing anthrax attacks, it could have be argued that law enforcement would not think 
twice about vials in a scientist’s car. New policies and advancement in research has 
demonstrated that law enforcement takes the threat of biological chemicals much more 
seriously than before.  The law enforcement community has also made more of an effort 
to increase data sharing between federal agencies, local law enforcement, businesses, and 
everyday citizens.  
Data Sharing During Leaderless Resistance Trend 
New methods of data sharing between government agencies were seen with an 
arrest involving the illegal sale of abrin in early 2014. In April 2013 agents from 
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) began conducting an investigation into illicit 
sales activity taking place on a website named “Black Market Reloaded” (BMR). BMR 
provided a platform for individuals to sell illegal goods such as biological agents and 
explosives, while hiding their true location. HSI agents began conducting an undercover 
investigation, in coordination with the FBI, on a BMR seller advertising the sale of abrin, 
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a deadly toxin much like ricin but more lethal.73 The BMR seller, Jesse William Korff, 
gave specific instructions to the undercover agent that “if you drop the abrin in 
someone’s drink Wednesday he will be dead Friday and there is no way to trace it after 
24 hours of ingestion.”74 Korff arranged a pickup of the toxin at a rest stop in Florida for 
the undercover agent and was arrested on January 18th, 2014. Coordination between FBI 
and HSI enabled a smooth arrest of an individual producing a biological agent intended to 
cause death.75  
Data sharing also occurred with the scientific community concerning the arrest of 
Jasheway. Further testing of the chemicals in the vials in his car revealed the DNA chain 
of ricin A, a non-lethal chain of the agent. Jasheway was conducting research in the UT 
lab using ricin A. It was recently noted that during the search of the Robertus lab in 
December 2011, federal investigators discovered “25-year-old archival samples of whole 
ricin…identified undisturbed in the back of a freezer.”76 Castor beans were also found in 
the lab, from which ricin is extracted. The head of the lab stated about the FBI that, “All I 
can tell you is that what they’re looking at now has nothing to do with the lab…They 
found something entirely different.”77 The facilitation of information concerning 
Jasheway’s research was essential to his arrest and the discovery of ricin on the premises.  
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The Role of International Actors During Leaderless Resistance Trend 
 The inclusion of the international community was seen with the 2011 address 
from Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State at the time, to the BWC. This address re-
opened doors that had been shut with the rejection of verification protocol that was 
brought forth during the Bush administration.78 The 2013 address by the U.S. delegation 
to the BWC also maintained an upbeat message about opening more doors for 
international cooperation and communication.79 While the bioterrorism arrests that have 
taken place during the past five years had an impact on domestic policies, it should also 
be noted that advancements made internationally will almost certainly affect the way the 
United States deals with the bioterrorism threat in the future.  
Conclusion 
 The bioterrorism threat is layered and has mutated since 2001 as the overall 
terrorism trend has shifted. The threat that came to light in September and October 2001 
changed the face of American bioterrorism policy but the groups, and more notably 
individuals, who wish to inflict harm on the United States have mutated their approach to 
go on undetected while inflicting the most amount of damage possible. The changes that 
took place between the Bush and Obama administrations concerning bioterrorism spoke 
to the threats that presented themselves at the time and the advancements in science that 
had occurred. Key differences in the Bush and Obama approaches to the bioterrorism 
policy were certainly politically motivated and highlighted each administration’s 
ideological approach to the complex issue. While the leaderless resistance trend that has 
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risen quickly from 2008 to 2014 played a role in the policy selection process, its role was 
not as large as initially hypothesized.  
Foreign policy changes overall lead to more inclusion of the international 
community in the fight against bioterrorism. The United States, and more specifically the 
Obama administration, has leaned more towards a policy of openness with the 
international community and more specifically with its allies in the past few years in 
order to broaden its security in the international community. The research capability 
improvements can be greatly attributed to solid advancements in science since the 
original Bush policy came out concerning bioterrorism. The role of law enforcement and 
data sharing, however, were impacted by the leaderless resistance trend. Leaderless 
resistance is certainly not limited to the bioterrorism threat as many other importance 
arrests have taken place since 2008 that were tied to individuals solely in possession of 
bombs or planning other small scale weapons attacks. The trend overall, and quite 
notably the bioterrorism aspect of leaderless resistance, has forever affected and 
improved the U.S. bioterrorism policy. Broader implications also exist for the overall 
international bioterrorism strategy when it concerns leaderless resistance. Many of the 
vulnerabilities present domestically concerning lone wolf activities with biological agents 
can certainly be present on a global scale. These weaknesses could also have an impact 
on future U.S. international bioterrorism strategies and international partnerships. While 
no one can predict what the future holds for the United States in terms of security against 
bioterrorism but one can hope that the approach taken by policy makers is and continues 
to be one step ahead of those looking to attack the United States. 
 
	   34 
Bibliography 
 
Ackerman, Gary, and Lauren Pinson. 2013. "Gauging the Threat." Defence Procurement 
International (August): 52-56. http://edition.pagesuite-
professional.co.uk/launch.aspx?pbid=4a891638-58....) 
Associated Press. "Jury Finds 2 Georgia Men Guilty in Ricin Plot.", January 17, 2014. 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/17/ricin-georgia-
guilty/4592157/ (accessed February 16, 2014). 
Bakker, Edwin and Beatrice de Graaf. “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: some CT 
approaches discussed.” Perspective on Terrorism 5, no. 5-6 (2011): 43-50. 
Binder, Markus, and Gary Ackerman. 2014. "Anatomizing Chemical Biological Non-
State Adversaries." 
https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTResearchBrief_Anatomizing.pdf. 
Biodefense: Next Steps, Senate Hearing (February 8, 2005) (statement of Dr. Penrose C. 
Albright, Department of Homeland Security, Assistant Under Secretary for 
Science and Technology). 
Blinder, Alan. "Defendant Admits Sending Letter With Ricin to Obama." The New York 
Times, January 17, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/us/defendant-
admits-sending-letter-with-ricin-to-obama.html?_r=0 (accessed February 27, 
2014). 
Bohn, Kevin and Kelli Arena. "White House- bound ricin letter posted on Web." CNN. 
http://articles.cnn.com/2004-02-23/us/ricin.probe_1_ricin-logs-and-time-sheets-
deadly-poison?_s=PM:US (accessed March 14, 2012). 
	   35 
Brooks, Risa A. “Muslim “Homegrown“ Terrorism in the United States.” International 
Security 36, no. 2 (2011): 7-47. 
Bush, George W. Biodefense for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: White House, 2004. 
Clunan, Anne L. “Building Information Networks for Biosecurity.” In Terrorism, War, or 
Disease?, eds. Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin, 293-310. 
Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2008. 
Cruickshank, Paul and Mohannad Hage Ali. “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New 
Al Qaeda.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, (2007): 1-14. 
Danzig, Richard. "A Decade of Countering Bioterrorism: Incremental Progress, 
Fundamental Failings." Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, 
Practice, and Science 10, no. 1 (2012): 49-54. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. "Amerithrax or Anthrax Investigation." FBI — 
Homepage. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/anthrax-amerithrax 
(accessed March 13, 2012). 
"Florida Man Arrested, Charged In New Jersey With Sale Of Deadly Toxin On 
Underground Online Marketplace." US Attorney's Office - District of New Jersey. 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/Korff,%20Jesse%20Arrest,%20Compla
int%20PR.html (accessed March 5, 2014). 
"Florida man faces bioweapon charge." CNN, January 14, 2005. 
http://articles.cnn.com/2005-01-13/us/ricin.arrest_1_ricin-steven-michael-ekberg-
castor-beans?_s=PM:US (accessed March 15, 2012). 
	   36 
Franco, Crystal and Mary B. Hansen. “The State of Biopreparedness: Lessons from 
Leaders, Proposals for Progress.” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense 
Strategy, Practice, and Science 8, no. 4 (2010): 379-384. 
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed and Madeleine Gruen. “Leadership vs. Leaderless Resistance: 
The Militant White Separatist Movement’s Operating Model.” 18 Feb. 2010. 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/publications/leadership-vs-leaderless-
resistance-the-militant-white-separatist-movement (24 Feb. 2012). 
Glassman, James. "We're Letting Our Bioterrorism Defenses Down." Forbes. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesglassman/2012/04/04/were-letting-our-
bioterrorism-defenses-down/ (accessed April 28, 2014). 
Jaslow, Ryan. “Ga. Men Arrested for Allegedly Plotting Ricin Attack: What’s Ricin?.” 
CBS News, November 2, 2011. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504763_162-
20128934-10391704/ga-men-arrested-for-allegedly-plotting-ricin-attack-whats-
ricin/.  
Johnson, M. Alex. "Florida teen sold deadly toxin abrin online, US says." NBC News. 
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/24/22435409-florida-teen-sold-
deadly-toxin-abrin-online-us-says?lite (accessed March 5, 2014). 
Kaplan, Jeffrey. “Leaderless Resistance.” In Inside Terrorist Organizations, edited by 
David C. Rappaport, 260-273. London: Frank Cass, 2001. 
Kindy, Kimberly. "J. Everett Dutschke's Journey to Ricin Suspect." The Washington 
Post, May 21, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/j-everett-dutschkes-
journey-to-ricin-suspect/2013/05/20/23483842-b9bd-11e2-aa9e-
a02b765ff0ea_story.html (accessed February 27, 2014). 
	   37 
Koblentz, Gregory D. “From Biodefense to Biosecurity: the Obama Administration’s 
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.” International Affairs 88, no. I 
(2012): 131-148. 
Koblentz, Gregory D. and Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Four Faces of Microbial Forensics.” 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 7, no. 4 
(2009): 389-397. 
Koblentz, Gregory D. “Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of 
CBRN Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 23, (2011): 501-520. 
Lemieux, Anthony, Jarret Brachman, Jason Levitt, and Jay Wood. "Inspire Magazine: A 
Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the 
Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model." Terrorism and Political 
Violence (2014): 1-18. 
 Lemonick, Michael. "Homegrown Terror." Time, February 16, 2004. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,588396,00.html (accessed 
March 13, 2012). 
 “Marion County Man to Plead Guilty to Possession of Ricin.” SP Times, April 20, 2005. 
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/04/20/news_pf/State/Marion_County_man_to_.sht
ml (accessed April 6, 2012).  
Morlin, Bill. "Ricin maker sentenced." The Spokesman-Review, October 29, 2003. 
http://www.spokesmanreview.com/news-story.asp?date=102903&ID=s1431564 
(accessed March 13, 2012). 
	   38 
"New Boston, Texas Woman Guilty of Sending Ricin Letters." U.S. Department Of 
Justice: US Attorney's Office. http://www.justice.gov/usao/txe/News/2013/edtx-
Richardson-121013.html (accessed March 2, 2014). 
"North Georgia Men Arrested, Charged in Plots to Purchase Explosives, Silencer and to 
Manufacture a Biological Toxin." FBI, November 1, 2011. 
http://www.fbi.gov/atlanta/press-releases/2011/north-georgia-men-arrested-
charged-in-plots-to-purchase-explosives-silencer-and-to-manufacture-a-
biological-toxin (accessed March 15, 2012). 
Obama, Barack. National Strategy for Biosurveillance. Washington, DC: White House, 
2012. 
Obama, Barack. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats. Washington, DC: 
National Security Council, 2009. 
Oswald, Rachel. "Despite WMD Fears, Terrorists Still Focused on Conventional Attacks 
| GSN | NTI." NTI: Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/despite-wmd-fears-terrorists-still-focused-
conventional-attacks/ (accessed April 27, 2014). 
Rafferty, Andrew. "Texas woman indicted over ricin letters sent to Obama, Bloomberg." 
NBC News. http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/28/19190519-texas-
woman-indicted-over-ricin-letters-sent-to-obama-bloomberg?lite (accessed 
February 27, 2014). 
Ryan, Jeffrey R., and Jan Glarum. "Case Studies." In Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 
Containing and Preventing Biological Threats. Amsterdam: Butterworth-
Heinemann, 2008. 137-154. 
	   39 
Sageman, Marc. Leaderless Jihad. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2008. 
Sell, Tara Kirk and Matthew Watson. “Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2013-
FY2014.” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and 
Science. September 2013, 11(3): 196-216.  
Tiech, Sarah. “Trends and Developments in Lone Wolf Terrorism in the Western World: 
An Analysis of Terrorist Attacks and Attempted Attacks by Islamic Extremists”. 
October 2013. International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 
http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qAv1zIPJlGE%3D&tabid=66. 
Tizon, Tomas. "Justice or Just Hysteria?." Los Angeles Times, April 16, 2004, sec. The 
Nation. http://articles.latimes.com/2004/apr/16/nation/na-ricin16.  
U.S. Congressional Research Service. Federal Efforts to Address the Threat of 
Bioterrorism: Selected Issues for Congress (R41123; Aug. 6, 2010), by Frank 
Gottron and Dana A. Shea. 
U.S. Statement at the Biological Weapons Convention: Meeting of the States Parties to 
the Biological Weapons Convention (December 9, 2013) (statement of 
Christopher Buck, Head of Delegation, United States of America). 
Wilder, Forrest. "Theft From UT Lab Prompts FBI Investigation of UT Student - The 
Texas Observer." The Texas Observer, March 9, 2012. 
http://www.texasobserver.org/forrestforthetrees/theft-from-ut-lab-prompts-fbi-
investigation-of-ut-student (accessed March 15, 2012). 
  
	   40 
Chapter 2: A Quantitative Approach to Predicting State Bioweapons Threats 
 
 While the threat of a state biological weapons program has waned in the past 
decade, it cannot be forgotten or pushed aside for the threat of non-state actor based 
threats. There was a time that state-run biological weapons (BW) programs were alive 
and thriving. The Soviet, and later Russian program, was the most haunting of all, 
encapsulating the largest and most robust biological weapons program the world had ever 
seen. Along with the Soviet program, came the programs of Iraq and South Africa. All 
three states held programs after the adoption of the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC), which became the international norm concerning biological weapons programs. 
When the United States and Britain abandoned their own BW programs, a shift occurred 
with the stigma surrounding offensive BW programs. Shortly after both of these 
programs ended in 1969, the BWC slowly began gaining ground. As the BWC has 
improved over the past decades, and the shift of the threat has moved towards non-state 
threats, the looming threat of a state run BW program has lost its weight.  
 Non-state threats remain high on the priority list for U.S. policymakers but the 
importance of the state-threat deserves a closer look. Given that there is now a precedent 
for rogue, meaning contentious states of U.S. world order, state-run BW programs, it is 
important to use this knowledge to help predict future BW threats towards the United 
States. How do known features of state-sponsored BW programs help produce a 
framework for predicting possible future threats to the United States? Overall, a 
combination of benign and threatening features (such as GDP, number of arms transfers, 
and infant mortality rate) of state-sponsored BW programs revealed behavioral patterns. 
These behavioral patterns were tested against current potential threat countries to reveal a 
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short list of possible future BW state threats towards the United States. Overall, the 
following states came up as the final list of possible future BW threats: China, Egypt, 
Israel, and Myanmar. After these results were analyzed for more specific patterns the 
following characteristics were present for these final threat countries: lower levels of 
democracy, lower press freedom ratings, high political terror ratings, and moderate levels 
of received arms transfers.   
Methodology 
 For this type of quantitative analysis it is important to lay groundwork for 
important terms found thorough the study. The historical group in this study is composed 
of rogue BW states, meaning states that were confirmed to have BW programs after the 
U.S. and Britain relinquished their BW programs in 1969. Through analysis, the three 
rogue BW states that will be analyzed are the Soviet Union (Russia), Iraq, and South 
Africa.80 These states were used for the historical group in order to identify potential 
patterns with rogue BW state behavior during the actual possession of a weapon program. 
These three historical states will be evaluated with seven benign and threatening features 
(utilizing datasets), from 1983 to 1993, to include: Gross Domestic Product, Freedom of 
the Press rating, religion percentage, Political Terror rating, arms transfers received, 
infant mortality rate, and science and technical journal articles produced.  
Patterns concerning each feature will be noted and tested against a list of current 
potential state threats. This potential threat group is composed of three sets of states: 
Non-signatory states to the BWC as of 2014, non-ratifying states to the BWC as of 2014, 
and threat countries identified in the DNI unclassified 702 reports on WMD threats to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 North Korea has long been considered to fall into the same category as Russia, South Africa, and Iraq but 
given an extreme lack of quantitative data across most datasets for the state, it could not be used for this 
analysis.  
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United States as of the last publication in 2012. Non-signatory states to the BWC are 
states that have neither signed, nor ratified the agreement. Essentially these states are not 
participating in the BWC at all but for the purpose of this study they will be referred to as 
non-signatory states. Non-ratifying states are those that have signed onto the BWC but 
have not ratified the agreement. By not ratifying the agreement, the state is not 
contractually bound to the agreement because, at a national level, the state has not 
implemented all of the terms. After the features are tested against the current threat states 
patterns will emerge to reveal a list of potential state BW threats towards the United 
States in the future.  
Population Selection 
The historical group was selected based on literature and reporting that those 
states had confirmed BW programs after 196981. Table 1 below provides states and the 
years they ran their BW programs: 
Table 1 
State Program Start/End Dates 
Soviet Union (Russia) 1926 - 1992 
Iraq ~1970 - 1995 
South Africa 1981 - 1993 
 
The non-signatory states to the BWC (non-participatory states to the BWC) and the non-
ratifying states are listed in Table 282: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 "CNS - Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present." James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). http://cns.miis.edu/cbw/possess.htm (accessed May 12, 2013). 
82 "The United Nations in the Heart of Europe | Disarmament | Membership of the Biological Weapons 
Convention." The United Nations in the Heart of Europe. 
http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/7be6cbbea0477b52c12571860035fd5c?OpenDo
cument#_Section1 (accessed May 12, 2013). 
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Table 2 
Non-Signatory Non-Signatory Non-Ratifying 
Andorra Mauritania Central African Republic 
Angola Micronesia Côte d´Ivoire 
Chad Namibia Egypt 
Comoros Niue* Haiti 
Djibouti Samoa Liberia 
Eritrea South Sudan* Myanmar 
Guinea Tuvalu Nepal 
Israel  Somalia 
Kiribati  Syria 
Marshall Islands  Tanzania 
* - These states were excluded from the end results because no data was available across the majority of 
datasets. 
The states deemed to be “high-risk” or threat states for WMD by the yearly DNI reports 
are seen in Table 383: 








Limitations/Delimitations For Datasets 
There are many delimitations and limitations surrounding this study. The limitations of 
the study are as follows: 
• Lack of international datasets that were available for the majority of countries to 
be analyzed. 
• Lack of datasets that were current (ending in 2013). 
• Some state data may have been incorrectly reported, especially given the “rogue” 
behavior of some states that were analyzed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 "Finder Results: 721 Reports." Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/finder-results?q=721+Reports (accessed May 12, 2013). 
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• Gaps in data for some datasets existed, therefore averages were estimated and the 
year of “last reported data” was used as the most up-to-date information for a 
state. 
There are also many delimitations to the study that are as follows: 
• The time span for features tied to the rogue BW states was kept to a 10-year span 
(1983 to 1993) in order to make sure data was pulled from a time period that all 
three states were actively running their BW programs. Approximations were 
made by the author for a few dates in order to keep results consistent. The same 
source for program dates was also used. 
• States that do not fall under the three categories (non-signatory, non-ratifying, and 
threat) were not analyzed due to a lack of available time. It could be argued that 
even states that belong to the BWC could be engaging in rogue BW activities.  
This is an ideal area for further research.   
• The “threat” countries discussed in the final section of the paper are gauged as 
threats to the United States, and not the global community as a whole.  While 
many of these nations would be perceived as “threat” countries to other members 
of the international community, it is important to note that this paper is written for 
the perspective of the United States’ national security.   
Benign and Threatening State Features Analyzed 
 The following state features were used to analyze state behavior. Datasets were 
found for each feature to provide detailed analysis of patterns and correlations. Specific 
scaling for each feature will be addressed later on in the paper. 
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• Type of Government 
o Measures the level of democracy within a state on a given year. 
o Democracy is defined by “the presence of institutions and procedures 
through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative 
policies and leaders”, “the existence of institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive”, and “the guarantee of civil liberties to 
all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.”84 
o Democracy “rating” is based on a scale from 0-10 (0 meaning no 
democracy present, and 10 meaning a democratic government). 
o Most recent reporting year is 2012. 
o Feature chosen to determine if less democratic states could correlate with 
possible BW program development.  
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
o Measured in U.S. dollars and is the “sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without 
making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources.”85 
o Calculated on a per year basis. 
o Most recent reporting year is 2012. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 "Polity IV Project: Home Page." Center for Systemic Peace: Home Page. 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (accessed March 12, 2014). 
85 "GDP (current US$) | Data | Table." Data | The World Bank. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed March 12, 2014). 
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o Feature chosen to determine if states with a higher GDP would shy away 
from rogue behavior such as developing BW due to their strong economic 
ties in the international community. 
• Freedom of the Press Rating 
o Measures how “free” press is within each state. This measurement spans 
three outcomes, “Not Free” [NF], “Partially Free” [PF], and “Free” [F]. 
These rating are measured using “methodology questions” and “indicators 
divided into three broad categories: the legal environment, the political 
environment, and the economic environment.”86 These categories are all 
concentrated on the press aspect of the society. 
o A minor limitation with this database is that for the years 1983 to 1988, 
the overall press status was not given, only the press ratings for print and 
broadcast media. For this study the print rating was used when the overall 
rating was unavailable. 
o Most recent reporting year is 2012. 
o Feature chosen to determine if freedom within the press could deter a state 
from engaging in rogue behavior, possibly out of fear that its actions 
would be discovered and reported by a media element that they are unable 
to control. 
• Religion Percentage 
o Measures the total percentage of a state’s population that practices religion 
in general. The sources varied from “census-based data, to specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 "Freedom of the Press | Freedom House." Freedom House. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-
types/freedom-press (accessed March 12, 2014). 
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estimates of religious groups, or specific sources that focused on a given 
religion in a longitudinal manner.”87 
o One minor limitation for this dataset is that data is only provided every 
half-decade (ex. – 1985, 1990, 1995, etc). 
o Most recent reporting year is 2010. 
o Feature chosen to determine if states that are historically against organized 
religion could be more likely to engage in rogue BW behavior.  
• Political Terror Rating 
o Measures ‘levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences 
in a particular year based on a 5-level “terror scale”’, compiling data from 
the U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
and the yearly country reports of Amnesty International.88 
o A “Level 1” describes a state where “under a secure rule of law, people 
are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional. 
Political murders are extremely rare.”89 
o A “Level 5” describes a state where “terror has expanded to the whole 
population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or 
thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.”90 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 "World Religions." COW Home Page. 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Religion/Religion.htm (accessed May 13, 2013). 
88 "Political Terror Scale : Download Data." Political Terror Scale : Home. 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/download.php (accessed March 12, 2014). 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
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o A delimitation for this dataset is the variability of the scaling for the 
Amnesty International data and U.S. State Department data. For this study, 
the ratings used were derived from the U.S. State Department data. 
o Most recent reporting year is 2012. 
o Feature chosen to determine if states that have a high terror rating are 
more likely to engage in other “socially unacceptable” behaviors such as 
BW development. 
• Arms Transfers Received 
o Measures number of arms imports received by a country in a given year.  
o Arms are classified as “military equipment” and “those that are produced 
or assembled under license or production is undertaken following the 
transfer of technology necessary for the production of military equipment 
(licensed production).”91 
o Sources range from media accounts to defense budget documents. 
o Most recent reporting year is 2011. 
o Feature chosen to determine if states that received high numbers of arms 
could be more likely to embrace other forms of warfare, such as the 
development of BW.  
• Infant Mortality 
o Measures the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births per country.92 
o Most recent reporting year is 2012. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 "SIPRI Arms Transfers Database — www.sipri.org." Welcome to SIPRI — www.sipri.org. 
http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed May 13, 2013). 
92 "Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) | Data | Table." Data | The World Bank. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN?page=5 (accessed March 12, 2014). 
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o Feature chosen to determine if states with mid-range infant mortality rates 
could be more likely to develop a BW program, given that they neither 
rate exceedingly high in scientific advancement nor are they a struggling 
developing nation.  
•  Science and Technical Journal Articles 
o Measures the number of “scientific and engineering articles published in 
the following fields: physics, biology, chemistry, mathematics, clinical 
medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth and 
space sciences.”93 
o Limitations for this dataset are that the majority of the data is restricted to 
the years 1985 to 2009 and reporting for Russia is only available for 1992 
and 1993. 
o Feature chosen to determine if more scientifically advanced states could 
be more likely to develop BW, given their strong scientific infrastructure 
within the state.  
Understanding Historical State BW Programs 
 In order to understand future BW threats to the United States it is important to 
understand what lead to the rogue programs used as the historical group in this study: 
Russia (USSR), Iraq, and South Africa. The history of these programs may help shed 
light on issues that may have been “red flags” for the international community as a 
whole. Specific methodological approaches to identifying BW programs could not be 
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found during the literature review process. The majority of scholarly work centered 
around non-state threats, and not state-centered threats, as explored by this study.  
It is important to note that all three of the BW programs discussed below took 
place during wars, both internal and external. Each of the states were experiencing 
internal and external pressures, some of which only furthered their respective programs. 
Unfortunately, a comprehensive study on the detection of state run BW programs, in 
terms of future threats, could not be located. The majority of scholarly articles discussed 
how these programs, that all took place when the BWC was enacted, could have been 
flagged through a “verification” protocol of the BWC. Given that a verification protocol 
still has not been adopted, and is not supported by the U.S., a method of detecting future 
BW threats is even more pressing and pertinent to this field of study. In total, a brief 
overview of the three programs will be provided in order to provide adequate background 
knowledge for the topic, given there is a lack of literature to predict this type of threat.  
The Soviet (Russian) BW Program 
 The Soviet BW program began much earlier than any of the other programs 
discussed in this study. From the 1920s, the Soviets built the largest BW program in the 
world and the denunciation of BW by the United States and Britain had no effect on their 
activities. When the United States halted their program in 1969, the Soviets did not 
believe that this had actually taken place, and continued their program under the belief 
that the United States was still producing offensive BW.94 During this time period, the 
Soviets ran their program under two main components: the Ministries of Defense and 
Agriculture and the other “under an ostensibly civilian pharmaceutical development and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen, 
New York: Copernicus Books, 2002, 35. 
	   51 
production complex known as Biopreparat.”95 Under these programs the Soviets explored 
the weaponization of the causative agents for smallpox, anthrax, and the plague, even 
after they had signed and ratified the BWC.96 
The international community was unaware of the continued activities of the 
Soviets until 1989, when Soviet defector Vladimir Pasechnik gave an immense amount of 
details to Britain and the United States regarding the continuing BW activities of the 
Soviets. The U.S. had believed since 1984 that the Soviets may have held an offensive 
program but their suspicions were realized with the defection of Pasechnik.97 In 1989, the 
United States and Britain questioned Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev about the BW 
program. Gorbachev expressly denied that such a program existed.98 Even after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the program continued. In 1992, Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin admitted that the USSR had “experienced a lag in implementing” the BWC and in 
1993 the United States could not conclude if the program had continued.99 After the 
admission of the BW program, Russia entered into a Trilateral Agreement with the U.S. 
and Britain to ensure that all three states were in compliance with the BWC. Visits to all 
three states were carried out in the 1990s but beliefs were still held that the Russians were 
maintaining their production means for BW, but that has been dealt with diplomatically at 
this point.100  
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97 Michael Moodie, "The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," The 
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The Iraqi BW Program 
The Iraqi government signed the BWC in 1972 but in the late 1970s they began 
their BW program, and started their “research and development” phase officially in the 
1980s.101 The Iraqi program produced many different agents, including the causative 
agents for anthrax, botulism, and ricin and moved onto the weaponization phase around 
1990.102 The government utilized production sites at Salman Pak, al Muthanna, and the 
largest, at Al Hakam. Intelligence agencies knew of the first two sites but were unaware 
of the Al Hakam site until the defection of Saddam’s brother-in-law, General Hussein Al-
Kamal, in 1995.103 The Iraqi government admitted to possessing a BW program in 1995 
and a few years later all of the production sites had been demolished.104 U.S. reports note 
that it is believed the Iraqi government was vague about continued possession of BW 
after 1995, in order to deter Iran. There are conflicting reports about whether the Iraqi 
government disposed of their BW stockpile completely after 1995, but U.S. government 
reports note that production ceased after 1995.105 
South African BW Program 
 In the 1980s the apartheid South African government started an offensive BW 
program, aimed at promoting the already oppressive apartheid government though 
targeted assassinations, sterility vaccinations, and killing of black troops in Rhodesia.106 
The program was named Project Coast and many different agents were developed, 
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including the weaponization of the causative agent for anthrax.107 The creator of the 
program, Dr. Wouter Basson, a “former Special Forces Army Brigadier and personal 
heart specialist to former President P.W. Botha”, spearheaded much of South Africa’s 
CBW activity during this time period.108 The program was reportedly disbanded in 1993, 
with the fall of the apartheid government.109 Project Coast remained undiscovered until 
the 1998 South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings were held 
concerning activities of the apartheid government.110  
Features of Historical State BW Programs 
 The following tables represent the data outcomes for each feature, in regards to 
the three rogue BW states (historical group), from years 1983 to 1993. Averages for each 
country in their respective dataset are provided after each table, along with a High-Low 
scale. This High-Low scale will be used to rate the 32 potential future threat states (non-
signatory, non-ratifying, threat). By identifying states that are within the High-Low range 
for a majority of the datasets (five or more), it may be possible to focus in on states that 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, 413. 
108 "What Happened In South Africa? | Plague War | FRONTLINE | PBS." 
109 Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, 413. 
110 "What Happened In South Africa? | Plague War | FRONTLINE | PBS."	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Table 4: Type of Government (Democracy Rating) 
Year 
  
Iraq Russia (USSR) South Africa 
1983 0 0 7 
1984 0 0 7 
1985 0 0 7 
1986 0 0 7 
1987 0 0 7 
1988 0 0 7 
1989 0 1 7 
1990 0 3 7 
1991 0 3 7 
1992 0 5 -* 
1993 0 4 -* 
Average 0 1.455 7 
High-Low Scale: 7-0 
*- Due to transition of the government, a rating could not be determined for these years 
The type of government, or democracy rating, feature in Table 4 reveals a pattern 
in Table 4 that states with no democracy to moderate levels of democracy could be 
potential BW state threats to the United States. This would mean that full democracies 
could be less likely to be considered as a possible BW threat in the future. 
Table 5: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Year 
  
Iraq Russia (USSR) South Africa 
1983 37,495,016,505 -* 86,013,096,939 
1984 42,530,668,954 -* 85,171,208,729 
1985 44,204,431,807 -* 67,066,232,219 
1986 39,991,570,164 -* 79,501,624,656 
1987 43,702,264,739 -* 104,022,118,647 
1988 43,410,815,201 -* 114,631,068,119 
1989 48,422,432,259 506,500,146,307 124,908,313,647 
1990 -* 516,814,258,695 112,013,934,433 
1991 -* 509,381,638,906 120,225,332,339 
1992 -* 460,205,414,725 130,513,031,862 
1993 -* 435,060,123,490 130,405,965,477 
Average 42,822,457,090 485,592,316,425 104,951,993,370 
High-Low Scale: 485,500,000,000 - 42,800,000,000 
*- No data available for these years 
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The Gross Domestic Product feature in Table 5 reveals a lack of data given 
government changes and conflict. Ultimately, the high-low range shows that moderate 
GDP amounts could signal the development of BW in a state. Historically, GDP levels 
will continue to rise over time, making it difficult to apply the High-Low range to current 
states but given that potential BW states could be slowly rising global economic powers, 
this High-Low range could very much be a good indicator of potentially rogue activity.  
 Table 6: Freedom of the Press Rating 
Year 
  
Iraq Russia (USSR) South Africa 
1983 NF NF PF 
1984 NF NF PF 
1985 NF NF PF 
1986 NF NF PF 
1987 NF NF PF 
1988 NF NF PF 
1989 NF NF NF 
1990 NF NF PF 
1991 NF PF PF 
1992 NF PF PF 
1993 NF PF PF 
Average NF NF PF 
High-Low Scale: NF - PF 
 
The Freedom of the Press feature in Table 6 reveals a High-Low range indicating 
that states with partially free to not free press could possibly produce BW. Restrictions on 
press freedom draws attention to the fact that a rogue BW state would most likely need 
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Table 7: Religion Percentage 
Year 
  
Iraq Russia (USSR) South Africa 
1985 98.8 38.36 96.01 
1990 98.22 36.04 95.93 
Average 98.5 37.2 96 
High-Low Scale: 98.5 – 37.2 
 
The percentage of religious individuals in a state feature in Table 7 reveals a very 
large range, given the inclusion of the communist USSR. Overall, states with a very high 
percentage of religious citizens could possibly indicate a state religion and would 
therefore fall outside of this High-Low range. The range seen with religion percentage 
appears to not reveal a solid pattern for potential state BW threats. 













The Political Terror Rating feature in Table 8 reveals that a rogue BW state would 
rate moderate to high on the Political Terror scale. Ideological beliefs of the leaders of 
these types of states tend to take precedence over the safety and security of their people. 
States that are a “5” on the scale are not included however, possibly given that full 
government repression would not breed an adequate environment for BW activities.  
Year 
  
Iraq Russia (USSR) South Africa 
1983 5 3 2 
1984 4 2 3 
1985 5 2 4 
1986 4 3 5 
1987 4 4 5 
1988 5 2 5 
1989 4 2 4 
1990 5 3 4 
1991 5 4 4 
1992 5 3 4 
1993 5 3 5 
Average 4.63 2.81 4.09 
High-Low Scale: 4.63 – 2.81 
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Table 9: Arms Transfers Received 
Year 
  
Iraq Russia (USSR) South Africa 
1983 3330 732 225 
1984 4637 915 123 
1985 4063 1003 26 
1986 3622 1389 211 
1987 3685 1542 16 
1988 1923 1618 7 
1989 1478 1205 13 
1990 775 688 13 
1991 -* 132 27 
1992 -* 40 363 
1993 -* -* 244 
Average 2939 926 115 
High-Low Scale: 2939 - 115 
*- No data available for these years 
 
The arms transfers received feature in Table 9 reveals a fairly large range of 
results. States heavily engaged in conflicts, internal and external, could fall into the target 
range of potential BW threats. It is also important to note that the arms transfers, as 
referred to in the dataset, are official. There are arguably a large amount of arms transfers 
that could take place on the black market, especially if the amount of conflict in the state 
is high. Generally, states that are not dealing with internal conflict and/or are not engaged 
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Table 10: Infant Mortality 
Year 
  
Iraq Russia (USSR) South Africa 
1983 44.6 25.8 59.8 
1984 42.6 25.3 57.6 
1985 40.9 24.8 55.5 
1986 39.6 24.4 53.5 
1987 38.7 24 51.7 
1988 37.8 23.7 50.1 
1989 37.1 23.3 48.9 
1990 36.7 23 48.2 
1991 36.3 22.6 47.6 
1992 36.2 22.3 47.2 
1993 36.2 22 47 
Average 38.8 23.8 51.6 
High-Low Scale: 51.6 – 23.8 
 
The infant mortality rate feature in Table 10 reveals moderately low to moderate 
rates as a possible indicator of BW program activity. Highly developed states with 
extremely low mortality rates could seemingly fall out of the threat range while 
developing states with extremely high rates could indicate that the rate of development 
would be at an inadequate level for BW program development. 
Table 11: Science and Technical Journal Articles 
Year 
  
Iraq Russia (USSR) South Africa 
1983 -* -* 2025 
1984 -* -* 2653 
1985 -* -* 2670 
1986 222 -* 2523 
1987 187 -* 2499 
1988 225 -* 2406 
1989 232 -* 2552 
1990 164 -* 2419 
1991 81 -* 2377 
1992 79 817 2025 
1993 74 19,659 2653 
Average 158 10,238 2437 
High-Low Scale: 10,238 - 158 
*- No data available for these years 
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The science and technical journal articles feature in Table 11 reveals a large scale 
for the number of articles in the threat range. While there are a considerable number of 
years that data was missing for the USSR, the overall trend reveals that a state that is 
most likely at risk of producing BW could have a history of scientific research and/or the 
scientific community infrastructure to even begin to produce something as technical as 
BW. The dramatic uptick in Russian journal articles drafted during the transition to a 
democratic government in the early 1990s demonstrates that the Russian scientific 
community did indeed possess the knowledge and skill to produce BW.   
Identification of Possible Future Threats Using Historical Features 
An analysis of results revealed that a total of four states fell within the High-Low 
target range for a majority (5 or more) of the features. These states have current 
conditions that mirror those in Iraq, Russian (USSR) and South Africa during the time 
when they all possessed offensive BW programs. The states came out of each of the 
historical state lists: non-signatory, non-ratifying and threat country. The results are seen 
in Table 12: 
Table 12 






A detailed analysis of each feature dataset is provided below in order to explain 
the overall characteristics of a possible future state BW threat. The 32 states (non-
signatory, non-ratifying, threat) that were pre-selected were rated on each feature for the 
most recent year data that was available. Some countries did not have any recent (within 
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the last four years) data reported for a particular feature, therefore those countries were 
excluded from those particular graphs.  
Figure 1 contains the results for the democracy rating dataset. A total of 19 states 
had results reported. 
Figure 1 
 
Of note for Figure 1, Egypt was not provided in the 2012 data due to the recent 
changes in government and the uncertainty of what the level of democracy was during 
2012. The two other identified final threat countries, Myanmar and China, fell right into 
the target range while Israel rated at the top of the democracy scale. Given the known 
situation in Egypt in 2012, it is evident that there is a correlation with lower levels of 
democracy and a state being a potential future BW threat.  
Figures 2 and 3 represent the results for the GDP dataset. A total of 26 states had 
results reported. The results are divided into two different figures due to the large scale of 
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2,014,774,938,342) were not included due to the large difference between their numbers 





Of note for Figure 3, Myanmar did not have any recent GDP data reported and 
was left out of the graph. The other three final threat countries, Israel, Egypt, and China 
(which was too big to even graph) have GDP numbers well above the target range. After 
seeing where the final threat countries fall, there appears to be little to no correlation 
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Figure 4 represents the results for the Freedom of the Press rating. A total of 30 
states had results reported. A numerical scaling was established as follows: 0=Not Free 
(NF), 1=Partially Free (PF), and 2=Free (F). 
Figure 4 
 
All of the final threat countries are graphed for Figure 4 and they all fall within 
the target range for potential rogue BW behavior. Given the results for this feature, there 
appears to be a correlation between low press freedoms and a state’s likelihood to present 
a BW threat to the United States.  
Figure 5 represents the results for the total amount of a state’s population that 
practices religion. A total of 28 states had results reported. Of note, Haiti was not graphed 
due to its unique result (135%), which is most likely due to the amount of missionary 
activity that takes place in the state. 
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     Figure 5 
 
 Many of the results for the religious percentage hover right around the target 
range. Although the numbers are extremely close, Myanmar (99.5%) and Egypt (99%) 
are above the target “High” of 98.5%. Israel and China fall right into the target range. 
Given that the majority of final threat states did not fall into the target range, no 
correlation appears between high levels of a population subscribing to a religion and an 
increased likelihood that the state will engage in rogue BW behavior.  
Figure 6 represents the results for the Political Terror Rating dataset. A total of 24 
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Figure 6 
 
 All four of the final threat countries are graphed above and they all fall into the 
threat range for political terror. China, Israel, and Myanmar all rate relatively high on the 
terror scale (4) and according to the codebook for the dataset the following features are 
likely for these states: “Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large 
numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of 
life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in 
politics or ideas.”111 Egypt rated as a 3, which means that “there is extensive political 
imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political 
murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for 
political views is accepted.”112 Overall, there appears to be a correlation between high 
political terror levels and a state’s likelihood to be a possible future state BW threat.  
Figure 7 represents the results for the total number of arms transfers per state. A 
total of 13 states had results reported. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 "Political Terror Scale : PTS Data." Political Terror Scale : Home. 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ptsdata.php (accessed March 12, 2014). 
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Figure 7 
 
All four final threat states are graphed for arms transfers received and they all fall 
within the target range. Given that they all fall into this range, it appears there is a 
correlation between moderate levels of received arms transfers and a state’s likelihood to 
present a BW threat to the United States in the future.  
Figure 8 represents the infant mortality rate per 1,000 births per state. A total of 
30 states had results reported. 
Figure 8 
 
Only one of the final threat states falls within the target range for infant mortality 
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correlation exists between higher infant mortality rates, which could arguably be an 
indicator for overall development, and a state becoming a possible future BW threat.  
Figure 9 represents the total number of science and technical journals produced 
per state. A total of 24 states had results reported. Of note, Russia (14,016.2) and China 
(74,019.2) were not graphed due to the large difference between their numbers and those 
of the other states. 
Figure 9 
 
 Of note for Figure 9, China is not graphed due to its extremely high journal 
articles produced (~74,000). Myanmar does not fall within the target range, along with 
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threat states are not within range, the production level of science and technical journals 
does not show a correlation with possible future state BW threats.  
Conclusion 
The results of this study revealed that the formulation did identify countries that 
may be a threat to the United States in the future, concerning BW. The final threat states 
were identified as China, Egypt, Israel and Myanmar. Overall, these final threat countries 
revealed the following patterns for possible future BW threats: lower levels of 
democracy, lower press freedom ratings, high political terror ratings, and moderate levels 
of received arms transfers. After analyzing these features and patterns it could be argued 
that high political terror ratings and moderate levels of received arms transfers hold the 
strongest correlation to rogue BW state behavior. Terror ratings reveal the overall internal 
security situation of a state while arms transfer levels not only reveal the internal but also 
the external security situation. High levels of external and internal conflicts were noted 
for all three of the historical states during the time periods when they had bioweapons 
programs. The research also revealed that while it was hypothesized that the following 
features would prove to present BW patterns, they in fact did not: GDP amounts, 
percentage of people subscribing to religion, higher infant mortality rates, and the 
production levels of science and technical journals.  
All in all, without follow-up reports that these countries do in fact have BW 
programs, it is impossible to tell if the methodology was successful. This study does 
provide a blueprint for future analysis in the field, regarding a variety of state-centered 
threats. In the future, it would be ideal to also factor in conflict-based datasets as well as 
those tied to pharmaceutical production levels, once they have been updated to a more 
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recent date. It is possible that these datasets could provide even more insight into patterns 
surrounding BW state threats. It is also important to note that two of the states, Egypt and 
Myanmar, have undergone major internal changes in the last few years, which could be 
seen as a mirroring of the situation in Russia (USSR) concerning their BW program. The 
inclusion of Israel was not expected but sheds light on the fact that the methodology used 
did not simply bring up states that have been in contention with the U.S. or global 
security norms. China, which is considerably larger than the other final threat states, has 
become more relevant to U.S. security in the past few years and could possibly be vying 
to expand its powers in “unconventional” ways. In conclusion, the threat of offensive 
state BW programs may no longer be the “popular” issue of the moment, but studies such 
as this could provide an important blueprint to ensure the United States can adequately 
protect itself from possible future state threats.  
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Chapter 3: Motivations Behind the U.S. VEREX Rejection and What the Future 
Holds for the Biological Weapons Threat on a Global Scale 
 
 The introduction of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) to the 
international community ushered in a new era for international regimes. The BWC came 
at a time when large powers were actively and aggressively pursuing their own biological 
weapons (BW) programs. The United States was a strong supporter of the loosely 
structured regime and encouraged open international communication concerning the 
future directions of the policy. Right before the 9/11 and anthrax attacks of 2001, the U.S. 
stance on the BWC changed dramatically. Gone were the days of building up a 
compliance regime and verification protocol to ensure states were not violating the BWC. 
The United States issued a stark warning to the rest of the international community that 
they would not allow an international regime to encroach on their sovereign rights, 
among those - their responsibility to protect their proprietary information and biomedical 
research.  
 A major point of contention for the United States has been the dual-use issue of 
the BWC, the argument that much of BW technology and agents can be used for 
legitimate and illegitimate purposes. The dual-use issue and pending verification protocol 
led the United States to halt all negotiations concerning the BWC, sending negotiations 
back almost 10 years. Since the 2001 negotiation breakdown the United States has 
softened its approach to the verification and compliance issues but has stood firm that it 
will not sign off on an additional protocol. This refusal to accept the protocol could be 
seen as a notch in the belt of the growing refusal by the United States to sign onto arms 
treaties and agreements since 2001. It could also be indicative of other major signatories 
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such as Russia and China remaining mum on verification procedures, much to the 
suspicion of U.S. officials.  
 This paper asks why the United States has refused to sign onto the verification 
protocol considering their track record with signing international arms agreements and 
their pre-2001 push for a verification protocol for the BWC. The background of the 
BWC, including the verification and dual-use issues, will be analyzed and discussed 
along with the U.S. refusal of the verification protocol and their publicized reasons for 
the refusal. An overview of the role of international regimes from the perspective of the 
United States will be analyzed as well as the more specific positions taken by the United 
States on arms treaties and agreements. Case studies of China and Russia’s stance on the 
BWC verification protocol will be analyzed in order to attempt to provide insight into the 
policy decisions of the United States concerning the protocol. The history of the United 
States and international agreements, partnered with the case studies of other states within 
the BWC, reveals potential answers as to why the United States has shied away from the 
verification protocol while the threat of bioterrorism continues to grow. Lastly, possible 
future policy directions for the United States will be discussed as alternatives to a 
verification protocol of the BWC. 
 Ultimately, the United States refusal of the BWC verification protocol, VEREX, 
appears to have been greatly influenced by the statements and actions of other BWC 
participating states like Russia and China. The actions and reactions of Russia and China 
have most likely over-ridden the U.S. desire for VEREX, dating back to pre-2001, and 
the general historical pattern of the United States signing onto arms agreements. These 
states pose a threat to U.S. sovereignty as a whole as well, leading the United States to 
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take measures to protect itself. Through analysis it becomes clear that VEREX should be 
taken off the radar for U.S. policy options but other credible solutions, mainly being 
national based initiatives, are on the horizon for the United States to deal with the threat 
of bioterrorism on a global scale. 
Background of the Biological Weapons Convention 
History of the Biological Weapons Convention  
The aftermath of World War I brought about a strong desire from the international 
community to ban certain chemicals and toxins from ever being involved in modern 
warfare again. The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare was negotiated at the 
League of Nations. This ban on chemical weapons and BW soon became an international 
norm but states, including France and the United States, saw a need for a more 
overarching agreement that would also ban the production and stockpiling of these 
weapons.113 At the time of the BWC adoption in the early 1970s, there were two primary 
parties with an interest in BW. These key players were militaries, who were “concerned 
about encountering them on the battlefield” and diplomats who sought to ban the 
weapons through the use of an international treaty.114 The short policy text seemed to 
suffice at a time when the 1925 Geneva Protocol was the only international agreement for 
BW use. Sometimes referred to as a “toothless wonder,” the BWC lacked the “key 
components of effective arms treaties: transparency, power of inspection, verification, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Dan Caldwell and Robert E. Williams, Seeking security in an insecure world, Lanham, Md,: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2006, 78-9. 
114 Gerald Epstein, "Biosecurity 2011: Not a year to change minds," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no, 
1 (2012): 32. 
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and enforcement.”115 The now 159 State Parties and 15 Signatory States make up the core 
of this policy regime and they rely on the “Review Conferences” to improve on this 
generic regime. 
 When the BWC was adopted, one of its Articles, Article XII, stated that the 
conference had to meet every five years to “review its operation, relevant scientific and 
technological developments, as well as progress towards the negotiation of a convention 
to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.”116 
The very first Review Conference met in March of 1980, thus beginning the process of 
setting more specific regime rules for participating and signing states to abide by. While 
some argue that the “slender” text of the BWC leaves too many open opportunities for 
non-compliance, others argue that the Review Conference setup enables states to build 
upon the policy regime, slowly. This slow buildup of regime norms and rules, in turn, 
creates a consensus among those signing states.117  
 The classic Review Conference structure that was used for decades was turned 
upside-down during the last day of the July 2001 conference when the U.S. 
representative, John Bolton, stated that the United States would not sign on to the 
verification procedures that were to be introduced by the Ad Hoc group of the BWC. The 
terms of this dismissal and breakdown of negotiations will be discussed later in this 
paper. During this dramatic Fifth Review Conference, all findings were suspended and 
many elements were sent back to the drawing board. In 2002 the Review Conference 
reconvened and the participating states were weary and cautious about proposing any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Laurie Garrett, Betrayal of trust: the collapse of global public health, New York: Hyperion, 2000, 503. 
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new negotiations. A medium was established in the form of the “Intersession” where 
states could openly discuss issues related to the BWC in-between review conferences.118 
While it has been highly successful, the fear of repetition, leading to less effectiveness, is 
one of the biggest hurdles for the renewal of the Intersessions.119 One of the most 
pressing issues discussed in these Intersessions concerns the struggle between science 
and security, the dual-use dilemma. 
The Dual-Use Issue 
 The majority of the topics discussed in the early Review Conferences (1980 and 
1986) leaned towards establishing basic structures for the BWC in terms of state 
coordination and agreement on the treaty phrasing. During the 1991 Third Review 
Conference the dual-use issue took center stage for the first time. One of the major topics 
discussed was the need for documentation from states in support of Article X of the 
Convention. Article X states that “To do all of the above in a way that encourages the 
peaceful uses of biological science and technology.”120 This need for further explanation 
also came about in terms of biodefense programs.121 States needed further clarification 
concerning whether the biodefense measures they had put into place actually violated the 
BWC, in terms of vaccines and stockpiles for medical testing. Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs) were also enacted for the first time after being introduced in 1986. The 
CBMs were intended to “reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, 
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and improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities.”122 
The dual-use issue is laden with ambiguities and misunderstandings but in order to gain a 
deeper understanding, the aspects of dual-use must be analyzed. 
 The dual-use issue is comprised of three main elements that require their own set 
of tools to battle. Element one is the fact that very often, those wishing to conceal the 
production or testing of BW use civilian facilities.123 This illicit activity is banned by the 
BWC mainly for the reason that possessing weapons in the first place is illegal but also 
for the fact that it contradicts the very principles of peaceful biological activities, as 
stated in Article X. One primary example of this element of the dual-use dilemma was the 
use of facilities in the Soviet Union that were advertised as being used to conduct civilian 
research in the early 1970s. These “clandestine biological weapons facilities” were used 
to produce and test BW for use by the Soviet military. Dozens of these facilities were 
utilized around the Soviet Union to support the Soviet BW program while keeping the 
international community in the dark.124 One other danger concerning the civilian facility 
usage is the fear that the biological strains could fall into the hands of a terrorist group. 
These “commercial” facilities, on the guise of being in the private sector, may not have 
the heightened security that an actual military facility would have.125 
 The second element of the dual-use dilemma is that equipment and biological 
agents are on one hand used for productive scientific research and on the other hand used 
for illicit BW production. Export controls are the only way to definitively limit the supply 
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of biological equipment and pathogens to those whom you trust.126 How does one 
determine whom to trust? The BWC is clear when it states that no one should be given 
access to research tools if their uses are not for peaceful purposes. The intention aspect of 
this element is the hardest to combat due to the fact that actors can go through great 
measures to ensure that their activities appear “legitimate”. Two national systems were 
created to monitor this issue: the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group 
system. These systems monitor the transfer of dual-use technology through export 
controls and are the strongest deterrents against biological equipment and agent 
misuse.127 Long lists of BW pathogens and materials that can be used to produce it are 
flagged as requiring export controls, thereby creating a record of what actors are 
purchasing what elements. While the creation of these systems has helped tremendously 
with the issue of biological tech transfers in certain nations, no one solution can keep BW 
elements completely out of the hands of those who wish to cause harm. 
 The third element of the dual-use dilemma is the availability and use of scientific 
information for subversive activities, namely BW production. Committee reports on the 
BW topic have implied that this issue is of the highest concern regarding non-state actors’ 
ability to develop or purchase BW. Many have argued that the “peaceful uses” of certain 
BW technologies are only creating a security risk for the international community and 
that such peaceful uses do not exist. The case studies most strongly referenced for this 
argument are those of the former Iraq and South African BW programs, both of whom 
used open source information to produce BW. Others argue that putting physical security 
measures in place as well as biosafety measures will enable scientific information to flow 
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freely while protecting this proprietary information from those who wish to do us harm. 
Higher security screenings for labs and technicians is one of the ways this is enforced. 
Lastly, one of the other concerns about information availability is the publishing of 
scientific research that can be used for BW production. Some believe that research needs 
to be vetted for potential negative uses while others feel that this action will lead to a 
detrimental attack on free scientific knowledge and will slow scientific advances that are 
used for the good of mankind.128 The dual-use issue overflows into many aspects of the 
BWC but most notably it is one of the central themes of the verification protocol. 
The Verification Protocol and the U.S. Refusal 
 On the final day of the Fifth Review Conference of the BWC, in July 2001, the 
U.S. Secretary of State for Arms Control, John Bolton, brought the entire Conference to a 
halt with the declaration that the United States would not sign onto any findings made by 
the “Ad Hoc” group and would veto any decisions made at the Conference.129 The “Ad 
Hoc” group had been formed in 1991 to begin the long and arduous process to “identify 
and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint” 
and it became known as the VEREX group.130 The original aspects agreed upon for 
VEREX involved three main elements: mandatory declarations, declaration follow-up 
procedures, and investigation of non-compliance.131 The mandatory declarations section 
required that all states submit declarations on activities that were carried out in all 
facilities located in their jurisdiction. These activities were noted for a particular period of 
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time that work governed by the BWC was carried out. The declaration follow-up 
procedures involved infrequent and randomly selected inspection of declared facilities as 
well as clarification procedures. Lastly, the investigation of non-compliance involved 
field investigations and facility investigations in order to uncover and deal with violations 
of the BWC.132 
Members of the BWC knew that the VEREX process would take a considerable 
amount of time and by the time that the Fifth Review Conference occurred it had taken 
10 years of hard work to come to a consensus. The sudden refusal by the United States to 
sign any agreement halted the Conference until 2002 when small working groups were 
held to discuss a rescue plan before the entire policy regime fell apart.133 The verification 
procedures that were in the final stages of approval involved “declarations and inspection 
analogous to those used to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons” 
but the United States concluded, “Such a protocol would not produce confidence 
commensurate with the cost and effort.”134 Some of the main points used by the United 
States to justify their refusal to sign onto VEREX were that actual verification of 
compliance could not be demonstrated due to the dual-use nature of biological production 
facilities, a verification regime cannot adequately detect clandestine activities which “can 
generate a false confidence that a country is in compliance with the treaty, when in fact is 
not,” and that intrusive inspections by international teams can put the United States at a 
greater risk for foreign espionage not only of military information but of commercial 
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proprietary information.135 The issue of compliance was discussed by the U.S. in a 
statement to the BWC in December 2013, reaffirming that the U.S. delegation “does not 
agree that there is a need to define which types of cooperation are ‘relevant’ to the BWC 
and which are not.”136 In order to understand the complexities of the verification protocol 
refusal, it is important to understand the history of the United States concerning 
international regimes, and more specifically, arms agreements. 
The U.S. History of International Arms Agreements 
 The U.S. position on international regimes has entered many phases over the 
decades, each with its own points of importance. The culture of multilateralism began 
with the regimes created after the failure of the League of Nations. These organizations 
included Bretton Woods, the United Nations, and NATO. They gave outside states a 
voice in U.S. policy, forever changing the role of the international community in U.S. 
domestic politics.137 The later entrance of the Cold War gave way to a new dynamic for 
international regimes. The United States spearheaded more international regimes during 
the beginning and height of the Cold War in order to legitimize the role of the state in 
comparison to the Soviet Union.138 Some argue that the U.S. focus has shifted 
considerably in the past few years and that international regimes are now viewed as more 
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constraining. This could be seen, by example, with the invasion of Afghanistan and the 
permission that had to be given by the UN to do so.139  
The Bush Administration had notable issues in regards to exercising sovereign 
rights within the realm of activities that are covered by an international regime. The 
Obama Administration has pushed through a few more policy ratifications and signatures 
but seems to have carried through the same hesitancy towards international regimes as 
the previous administration.140 Obama has also pushed for the participation of the United 
States on an ad hoc basis. Some argue that this is purely for the public relations aspect of 
diplomacy because the ad hoc meetings are not attached to any binding agreements or 
overarching international institutions.141 International regime participation is an 
extremely important aspect to guide the understanding of the BWC. More specifically, 
international arms agreements can reveal patterns concerning U.S. involvement. 
The idea of arms control and agreements gave rise during the Cold War, when the 
United States and the Soviet Union battled for soft power. Years after the fall of the 
Soviet Union the role of arms agreements held much less importance in the international 
arena.142 A few key agreements, however, took shape during the Cold War and continue 
to morph in the more recent years. The United States has been involved with several arms 
agreements including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the New START 
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treaty.143 The United States has signed and ratified all of the above treaties/agreements 
except for the CTBT. In many instances the United States initially did not ratify and 
chose to at a later date, which leads some to believe that ratification for the CTBT could 
be in the future.144 While some see the changing opinions of administrations as a general 
distrust of international regimes, others view this behavior as the United States struggling 
to reconnect with its “soft-power capacities.”145 Ultimately, a verification protocol of 
some degree is present in all of the above international regimes. This analysis of arms 
agreements leans heavily towards another type of outside influence over the refusal to 
verify the BWC, whether it is the role of other signatories or internal state influences. The 
role of other large states within the BWC, more specifically China and Russia, will be 
analyzed in order to identify patterns of behavior between the U.S. verification decisions 
and actions of states of high importance within the BWC.  
Case Studies of Other Large BWC States 
 The U.S. stance on the BWC has not changed since the 2001 rejection, which 
would lead one to believe that another factor is holding the United States back from 
signing. Ultimately, the case studies of China and Russia will reveal that these state’s 
actions have played a strong role in the U.S. refusal of VEREX. The actions of these 
states have had a strong influence on U.S. policy decisions and they present a threat to 
U.S. sovereignty if the United States submitted to a policy like VEREX.  
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Russia and the Soviet Union  
 The role of Russia and the USSR with the BWC is truly unique. The USSR signed 
onto the BWC in 1972, the year it was ratified. Later it was discovered that the Soviets 
never halted their BW program after its initiation in the 1920s. The USSR continued their 
offensive BW program in 1973 while making promises to the international community 
that they would abide by the BWC.146 During the continued negotiations for the BWC, 
the Soviet Union was developing the “world’s largest and most sophisticated biological 
warfare program”, which was managed by the governmental agency Biopreparat.147 The 
reasoning behind the BW program was later revealed to be that the USSR did not believe 
the United States had given up its BW program when Nixon announced that they would 
be joining the BWC in the early 1970s. The Soviets saw this declaration by the United 
States as the great “American lie” and felt that their BW program was a “response in 
kind” to the United States and Nixon’s statements.148 After years of suspicion by the 
United States concerning the behavior of the USSR, the United States went public with 
their allegations of a Soviet BW program in 1984. Department of Defense and 
Congressional reports were published that stated the Soviets had very likely been 
developing a BW program that was in violation of the BWC.149 After years of the BW 
program being developed, reports of an incident at Sverdlovsk, Russia in 1979 fueled 
these suspicions. Dry anthrax spores from a military compound were accidentally 
released into the atmosphere, killing approximately 66 people. While the Soviets claimed 
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the outbreak was due to tainted meat consumption, the United States suspected that this 
originated from a BW facility.150  
 In 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin made a public statement that the BW 
program of the former USSR had continued past the adoption of the BWC.151 After the 
confession by the President, the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia entered into 
the Trilateral agreement that stated all three states would work to be “in full compliance 
with the Biological Weapons Convention” and confirmed that the states would cease any 
BW programs if they indeed had them.152 The Trilateral agreement also entailed 
inspections of facilities in all three states to ensure mutual compliance with the 
agreement. After multiple visits to Russian, British, and American facilities it became 
clear that the inspections would become a tit-for-tat pattern of transactions. The U.S. 
government made numerous statements after their visits to Russian sites with the British 
that they were not happy with the evasiveness of the Russian military concerning 
different sites and felt that the evidence they found supported beliefs that Russia had 
maintained its BW capabilities in spite of the various agreements they had signed onto. In 
turn, the Russians issued multiple statements after their visits to U.S. facilities that it was 
clear the United States was engaging in BW activities and maintaining their capabilities 
to produce BW at a moments notice.153 It has also been reported that even after Yeltsin 
stated Russia would end its BW activities in 1992, the Ministry of Defense overrode his 
statements and the BW program continued.154  
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Since the 1992 declaration by Yeltsin it has been noted that Russian officials have 
never publically acknowledged production of BW again. It has been noted that Russian 
government officials have continued to play “word games” and in 2001 officials stated 
that Russia and/or the Soviet Union as never produced or stored BW.155 President Putin 
played a large role in these “word games” when he publically stated in 1999 that Russia 
has only had a defensive BW program, which is permitted by the BWC.156  
 The United States has continued to express concern of the state of Russia and 
their previous BW capabilities. In 1998, following years of previous inspections, U.S. 
officials stated they were concerned that the Kremlin could start production of BW again 
if the need arose. Officials stated that the capabilities to produce BW in Russia were still 
very much in place.157 An example of the potential capability was exhibited by the 
Sverdlovsk incident in 1979. According to reports, the Sverdlovsk location was 
dismantled in 1985 and rid of all BW production equipment. In 1992 a Russian 
correspondent visited the facility and noted that the equipment there was outdated and 
could not compare to American military equipment. Due to the fact that the equipment 
should have been dismantled in 1985, it was interesting the find that a correspondent 
came across equipment at the facility. Ever since 1992, no other correspondents, or states 
for that matter, have been given access to Sverdlovsk and local journalists have claimed 
that the location has resumed some activities after new equipment was purchased from 
Japan and other countries.158 Some scholars argue that the preponderance of evidence 
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suggests that the USSR BW capability has been clearly adopted by Russia and 
incorporated into the “classified military framework” and overall military system.159  
More recent evidence has suggested that Putin is looking to reinvigorate the old 
BW production capabilities and system to further his view of a revitalized Russia. A 
March 22nd, 2012 meeting attended by Putin and his ministers noted a statement made 
by the Ministry of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov when he stated to Putin that his 
department had “thoroughly studied your article [in which the tasks are listed and 
explained] and prepared a plan for implementing the tasks.” The fourth task on Putin’s 
list was “the development of weapons based on new physical principles: radiation, 
geophysical, wave, genetic, psychophysical” and as of April 4th, 2012, this fourth task 
had been removed from the online press release.160 This declaration by the Russian 
government of a new focus on weapons that fall under the “genetic” category can be 
quickly interpreted to entail some type of BW capability. Evidence has revealed that the 
Russians have preserved not only their capabilities but their “recipes” as well. These 
recipes also entail munitions specifications if the need should arise.161 Scholars have 
noted that the signatories of the BWC and the United States must urge Russia to open 
their doors to inspections and relinquish their recipes and ammunition specifications.162 
Overall, the Russian BW threat has continued to remain on the radar of the United States 
and has undoubtedly played a role in their decisions concerning the BWC.  
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China 
 Another state of concern for the United States that has also been discussed in 
scholarly literature is China. China’s history with BW is starkly different than that of 
Russia. The most synonymous event that speaks to China’s experience with BW is the 
testing of the Japanese Unit 731. Field tests were conducted in approximately 11 Chinese 
cities, killing more than 200,000 during World War II.163 These horrific events were 
forever engrained in the minds of Chinese citizens and continued to be relevant when 
other offensive programs, such as those belonging to the United States and the USSR, 
were created off the research the Japanese conducted. At the onset of the BWC in 1972, 
China refused to join because it saw the treaty as discriminatory against developing 
countries but finally agreed and signed in 1984. The one condition of the 1984 signature 
was that China agreed that the BWC would be legally binding only if other signatories 
followed the agreement.164 In the late 1980s, after China signed onto the BWC, there was 
a reported accidental release of hemorrhagic fever in the Xinjiang Province. Further 
investigation and media accounts revealed that the outbreak was most likely derived from 
a lab where scientists were “weaponizing viral diseases” but an official government 
statement was never released.165 This accidental release raised suspicions about the 
Chinese and their potential to have a BW program.  
When the verification protocol discussions arose in the BWC in the early 1990s, 
China was very involved in the procedure. The Chinese government was primarily 
motivated by the “assurance that its potential rivals, such as the United States and Japan, 
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had no offensive BW.” Much like their Russian counterparts, Chinese officials hold 
steadfast that the United States did not give up their BW capabilities when Nixon 
announced the end to BW research. This belief also played a role in the verification 
protocol proceedings because China could not accept that the United States was BW free 
without being able to search all of its facilities.166 While China has pushed for a 
verification protocol they also see the other side of the debate. Due to their positioning in 
the technology and industrial sector, Chinese officials have stated that due to the rapid 
pace of biotechnology, a verification protocol would not work because it would be 
extremely difficult to distinguish what is defensive and what is offensive.167 This dual-
use concern also mirrored itself in the activities of the Chinese government when the 
head of the Anti Biological Warfare Unit (aka The Institute of Military Medicine) gave 
an interview in 1994 and stated that the Chinese government does not have an offensive 
BW program. Of note, The Institute of Military Medicine was not listed on the 
Confidence Building declarations for the BWC that China had submitted for review. It 
was noted that the Institute carries out work that is dual-use in nature and is not overtly 
related to the Chinese military even though its title offers another view.168 
 The joining of the BWC by China is indicative of a growing trend of becoming 
more involved in disarmament and arms control negotiations.169 Overall, China sees arms 
agreements as a “part of a Marxist struggle among nations for security and dominance” 
and notes that they are “beneficial for promoting [their] independence, freedom, and 
defensive posture, as well as being good for gaining sympathetic public opinion, uniting 
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the broad majority.”170 It would seem as though China sees international arms agreements 
as tools to manipulate. This raises concerns about how much concern the country really 
has for real proliferation issues and the overall growing threat of BW.171 Another point 
for concern is that China has been noted in DoD reporting to have maintained some 
elements of an old offensive BW program for the 1950s and is believed to possess “an 
offensive [BW] capability based on technology developed prior to its accession to the 
[BWC] in 1984.”172 The infrastructure of the China’s biotechnology market has raised 
additional concerns about its dual-use capabilities, primarily in regards to their 
capabilities to produce a large number of vaccines that could arguable make them the 
“largest vaccine-producing nation.”173 A large amount of Chinese publications 
concerning BW-related research activity have also drawn the attention of states like the 
United States.174 The rejection of the verification protocol by the United States in 2001 
renewed suspicions by the Chinese government that the United States was again pursuing 
an offensive BW program and by 2005 there was a growing number of civilian 
organizations in China that had ties to the military biodefense structure.175 Overall, the 
threat from China continues to grow as their positioning in the biotechnology field grows 
as well. 
The Influence of Russia and China over U.S. Rejection of the Verification Protocol 
 The complicated dance between the United States and countries like Russia and 
China has continued to bleed into the issue of biosecurity. The analysis of the history of 
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BW with Russia and China reveals that both states used perceived actions by the United 
States to “justify” their own seemingly subversive activities. This issue can be seen as 
somewhat of a “chicken and egg” scenario. Have actions by the United States caused 
China and Russia to pursue activities that are not on par with the BWC, in turn creating 
an unattractive environment for the United States to accept VEREX? Or have actions by 
Russia and China created a threatening environment for the United States, therefore 
pressuring the United States to remain closed off to protocols like VEREX? The United 
States may have influenced the activities of Russia and China but ultimately it appears 
that the actions of Russia and China have been the primary motivator for the United 
States to reject VEREX. The U.S. track record with international arms agreements leans 
towards United States eventually complying but that does not appear to be in the horizon 
for VEREX. VEREX is not the ideal choice for the United States to deal with the threat 
of bioterrorism on an international scale but there continues to be a push in that direction 
according to the language of recent BWC meetings. 
The Renewed Argument for the Verification Protocol 
Since 2009 there has been a greater push for more international standards that 
some feel cross into the territory previously covered by VEREX. Many have voiced the 
opinion that a comprehensive international oversight system for the BWC, and more 
specifically for biotechnology, be created. The push for this type of organization has not 
been received well, which is assumed by most to be tied to the verification protocol and 
dual-use dilemma.176 Some possible directions for these international standards in the 
future include three main aspects, the first being the creation of the “Organization of the 
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Prohibition of Biological Weapons” which would be created to “supervise the 
implementation of the BWC’s provisions by all state parties.”177 The second possible 
direction would be using the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as the organization 
to ensure that state parties are complying with the rules states in the BWC. Given that the 
CWC has a functioning verification protocol, some see it as the key for creating a lasting 
verification protocol for the BWC. Lastly, the third possible direction would be the 
strengthening of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to become the supervising body 
to ensure that all aspects of the BWC are implemented by the states involved with the 
convention.178 The ISU was established to work on the implementation of Confidence 
Building Measures (CBMs) and to begin the process of establishing an open dialogue 
with the international scientific community. During the Intersessional meetings that took 
place from 2007 to 2010, the ISU engaged several international scientific groups and 
helped spread information to “do-it-yourself” biology enthusiasts as well as “industry 
groups, scientific societies, and governments to promote the secure development of 
synthetic biology.”179 The increase in budget and staff for the ISU in 2011 gives hope to 
VEREX proponents that the work that was carried out in the past five years prior will 
only continue to grow.  
Overall, parties that pushed for VEREX have been attempting to find alternatives 
within the international regime structure to have a verification protocol, without referring 
to it as such. The international regime structure does contain some alternatives to 
VEREX, which may be credible options for the United States to explore. More 
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importantly, national standards for each state can provide additional options to keep the 
threat of bioterrorism at bay for not only the United States, but the entire international 
community as a whole.  
Alternatives to Verification Protocol for the Future 
Global Scientific Community Outreach 
 The changes in the BWC since 2011 are notable and have set the stage for a 
variety of possibilities in the future, in lieu of a verification protocol. One of the most 
important elements that will surely continue and thrive in the coming years is the level of 
engagement with the global scientific community. One such engagement would involve 
an “internationally agreed constraint of shared information to contain real threats until 
defenses can be developed.”180 If scientists are knowledgeable about the threat level of a 
certain piece of research or advancement in technology, it could be argued that they could 
hold onto the information until an analysis of threats surrounding it and possible solutions 
could be found. Along with showing more constraint, there will be a need to educate 
scientists and students working in the life sciences on this issue and many others 
surrounding the dual-use issue of the biosciences, in order to breed a “culture of 
responsibility, awareness, and vigilance.”181 Education courses are a possibility to 
provide a basis and a norm for behavior related to the biological science sector.182 This 
training would need to be established at an international level to ensure that information 
is not watered down. Representatives for the BWC also note that issues may arise 
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because of the dilemma that the measurements of effectiveness for these types of classes 
simply do not exist.183 
 Methods for future engagement have also been pushed within the already existing 
BWC structure. The growing importance of the ISU is noted as being a big player in the 
future of engagement with the scientific community. If the verification aspect of the ISU 
can be kept at bay, this would be an extremely useful tool for communication. Within the 
BWC structure there has also been a push for a “code of conduct” for scientists tied to the 
life sciences. During 2005 meetings between experts and the state signatories to the BWC 
in Geneva, the parties considered the “content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of 
conduct for scientists.”184 This “code” would encourage the engagement with scientists 
across the globe and make them aware of the BWC and its mission, thereby in theory, 
creating a safer environment built up against the use of BW.  
 In addition to the BWC structure, other programs also exist to improve 
engagement with the scientific community and they are continuing to grow in strength. 
One such program is the Global Partnership Against Spread of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, created at the G8 Summit in 2002. The G8 agreed to pay $20 billion up to 
2012 and in 2011 leaders agreed to extend the partnership that would reach out to 
scientists that were formerly working for weapons programs in countries such as the 
Soviet Union. This type of program closely mirrors the outreach steps taken within the 
United States with its scientific community. The Global Partnership now consists of 23 
countries that are working to reinforce “the safe and beneficial use of the life sciences 
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and biotechnology internationally.”185 The Partnership’s goal in the future must be to 
engage with those scientists who have never been involved in any type of weapons 
program, creating more dialogue at an international level. Outreach with the scientific 
community is a possible direction for the BWC, but advances in biotechnology are also 
of great importance. 
Adapting to Advances in Biotechnology 
 Biotechnology advances at a rapid pace, which makes it extremely difficult to 
keep up with all of the new technology that could have an impact on the BWC. At the 
2001 review conference the United Kingdom pushed for the creation of a Scientific 
Advisory Panel for the BWC. This panel would “define what research should be allowed, 
what should be prohibited and what research findings should be subjected to restrictions 
or restraints on communication.”186 The very future of the BWC is at stake if this 
“mechanism” cannot be put into place across all state parties to the convention.187 The 
advisory panel would also be a depository for specific science and technology papers that 
tie directly into the BWC framework and area of concern. A more frequent meeting of 
science advisors has also been brought up concerning the BWC.188 Due to the fast pace of 
biotechnology, members of the board would have to meet more frequently than every five 
years to discuss new and upcoming scientific publications.  
 A report released in 2011, just prior to the Seventh Review Conference, 
highlighted the interdisciplinary nature of rapid biotechnology changes and the “extent of 
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its diffusion around the world.”189 The report was published by the US National 
Academies and was based on a study in 2010 in Beijing. The Beijing international 
workshop brought attention to the various aspects of rapid changes in the life sciences 
and was a rare glimpse of the scientific community reaching out to engage with the 
BWC. While it is important for these scientists to engage with the BWC, it is also 
imperative that those implementing the BWC understand the advances and what must be 
done to adapt to them, without crossing too heavily into the verification protocol 
aspects.190 While these changes at an international level are important, so are the policies 
that are available at the national level. 
Creation of National Standards 
 The United States created the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity 
(NSABB) after the Fink Committee report was published that brought attention to the 
fact that life sciences research may be used for BW production and bioterrorism. The 
NSABB created an oversight structure for the United States that ensured active 
government involvement while pushing for the self-governance standpoint.191 In 2006 the 
United States also created the Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP) out of the U.S. 
Department of State to engage countries concerning “national security, science, and 
public health issues, towards reducing biological risks.”192 The NSABB and BEP are 
enabling the United States to live up to its obligations in signing the BWC, without 
signing onto a verification protocol. Essentially, these two organizations serve as a 
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verification protocol within the United States itself. The United States, Britain, and other 
nations have also created their own export controls concerning agents and strains that 
could be used for BW production.193 These nation regimes, namely the Wassenaar 
Arrangement and the Australia Group system, are legally binding within their states to 
restrict dual-use technology as well. Ultimately, the national based programs appear to be 
a very credible option for the United States in the future. 
Conclusion 
 VEREX came extremely close to being adopted in 2001 but with the rejection by 
the United States, the future successes of verification policies appear highly unlikely. The 
motivations behind the VEREX rejection are complicated and are certainly multi-faceted. 
Most notably, the actions and reactions of states such as Russia and China have most 
certainly pointed to those states having an influence over U.S. decision-making 
concerning VEREX. It is highly likely that the United States, given its statements about 
VEREX, sees these two countries as potential threats to their sovereignty. This threat will 
only become more magnified if the United States chose to sign onto a binding agreement 
like VEREX. While one may also argue that the general stance of the United States 
towards international arms agreements plays into the decision about VEREX, it actually 
seems as if the refusal goes against past patterns concerning U.S. involvement with arms 
agreements.  
There are a multitude of alternatives to VEREX that the United States may choose 
to explore in the future. It appears that the United States is investing more resources into 
national based programs, in order to increase security but to also project to other BWC 
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signers that they are making strides to withhold the articles of the BWC. While 
verification is unlikely to happen and is not the ideal policy choice for the United States, 
it appears that there are still policy options available at the international level of the BWC 
in order to deal with the threat of BW and bioterrorism, such as the BWC ISU and State 
Department BEP program. While some of the primary signatories of the BWC may not 
agree with the U.S. decision to reject VEREX, it appears that the United States has plenty 
of avenues to prove to them that they are committed to dealing with the threat of BW 
directly and effectively.   
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CONCLUSION 
The threat of bioterrorism and bioweapons is real, and while other imminent 
threats  such as drastic state regime changes and international terror groups have taken 
center stage, one must not forget that these changes can correlate directly with a rise in 
the biological threat to the United States. Anthrax introduced the threat of bioterrorism to 
the U.S. public and while there are many cases that have not made the news since then, 
the threat is still alive and well. The detection methods for those looking to do harm have 
shifted in response to the new leaderless resistance approach, but law enforcement and 
policy makers must stay one step ahead in order to neutralize the threat to public health, 
as well as preventing the deaths of innocent Americans by biological agents. While it is 
clear that domestic politics and ideological differences played a role in Presidential 
administration decisions concerning bioterrorism, a more in-depth analysis may reveal 
intricacies of how domestic politics can shape a policy like bioterrorism defense. These 
intricacies could arguably include favoritism towards the funding of certain bio-related 
security projects, the swift de-funding of projects for political dealings, and a variety of 
other factors.  
It is important to note that the overall growing domestic threat of leaderless 
resistance is not restricted to those following an overarching ideology. The leaderless 
resistance trend is hard to solely quantify as a terrorism-based activity when some of the 
case studies could easily tie to criminal actions. Given the resources available it was 
difficult to discern the true intentions behind many of the case studies if the perpetrators 
did not outwardly state what their motivations were. The domestic threat could 
encapsulate those with direct links to a terrorist organization launching an attack within 
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the United States, whether they act alone or within a cell. Given that U.S. law 
enforcement has made major strides in detecting that type of behavior, it could be argued 
that the leaderless resistance route is far more likely to be taken. Overall, the next 
administration must continue to morph our bioterrorism strategy to respond to changes in 
the threat streams and not just use the strategy for political purposes.  
While the biological threat has been sparsely visible in the U.S. media and policy 
outlets, the brief mentions of it almost exclusively tie to a non-state actor obtaining or 
weaponizing an agent to attack the United States. The policy shift after 9/11 from state-
based threats to non-state actors seems to have lessened the attention that must be given 
to state-based threats. It is paramount that in this time of transition from the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, to a pivot in Asia to maintain global dominance, that the United States 
begin to refocus its efforts on potential state-based BW programs that could be hiding 
under their radar. The quantitative analysis seen in this thesis is one that is difficult to 
prove given it is attempting to make future predictions, but one must not forget the 
importance of the phrase “history is likely to repeat itself.” Historical reviews serve a 
purpose and the state threat identification seen in this thesis does just that by attempting 
to identify patterns in state behavior that could open up discussion into this threat that has 
received little attention. One direction that this research could take in the future would be 
to analyze across more datasets with a larger population. There was a selection process 
due to time constraints that could easily be widened to all of the states that belong to the 
BWC. It would be beneficial to further study threats that may be hiding just under the 
surface or in countries considered to be allies of the United States.  Additional “features” 
could also be analyzed with the addition of more datasets. Datasets pertaining to conflict 
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levels within states and their state neighbors would be useful as well as total monetary 
amounts for state pharmaceutical industries and the number of declared biosaftey labs 
within a state’s borders. The reality of the situation is that state-based programs, while 
presenting an outward and obvious threat of using BW against the United States, can also 
open up possibilities of other actors getting their hands on BW to unleash it on whomever 
they see fit.  
The signing of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972 seemed to bring a 
sigh of relief to the international community. States acknowledged that they indeed had 
programs in the past and were willing to give them up for the greater good. As seen in 
Chapter 2 however, that did not always occur. Given that the threat was still very much 
alive, the United States pushed for a verification protocol along with other signatories but 
then changed their mind in 2001. While it appears that the actions of other anti-VEREX 
states such as Russia and China influenced the U.S. decision to not adopt VEREX, the 
United States must act to adopt a policy toolbox to prove their willingness to help battle 
this threat at the international level. Out of all of the policy options, domestic programs 
seem the most compelling way to battle the biological threat by focusing on relationships 
with the scientific community; however, one must not forget the need for international 
involvement in order to protect the global community as a whole. International outreach 
and scientific networks appear to be the biggest alternative at the global level to help 
compliment the U.S. domestic programs. While a thorough analysis of U.S. actions 
pointed strongly towards Russia and China as the driving factor behind U.S. decision 
making to reject VEREX, it is likely that more information from government sources 
(that are not available to the public) would reveal information about the historical 2001 
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decision. Anecdotal evidence rising from both the Russia and China’s case studies were 
speculation but given the limited sources available, they appeared to be paramount to 
showing a pattern of behavior that would challenge the United States. Future policy 
directions in lieu of VEREX are likely to arise with changes in scientific knowledge and 
information sharing. The United States must be proactive in exploring all avenues and 
working to ensure their partners in the BWC that while the likelihood of the United States 
signing onto VEREX appears slim, the country will do everything in its power to mitigate 
risks associated with BW at a global level.  
As complex and intermingled as the biological threat is, it will only continue to 
mutate and rise as advances in technology and scientific knowledge increase. The United 
States must remain at the forefront of this threat, become a proactive actor and not just 
wait for the next attack to occur. All too often with U.S. security policy there is a rather 
reactionary approach and one that involves an analysis of “what went wrong.” Just like 
the nuclear threat, the biological one can have catastrophic consequences if U.S. policy 
makers wait around to extinguish the next fire to appear on the horizon.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
